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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 7

DECEMBER 1952

NUMBER 1

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATUTORY

CORPORATION LAW
by FLOYD A. WRIGHT*

At the middle of the last century corporation statutes were callow and
meager.' The composite of their omissions and limitations constricted the
range of corporate endeavor to an exiguous course. The trickle from the
headspring of the neoterical system of free enterprise had gradually expanded
into a tiny rivulet, destined to progressively assume torrential proportions.
The increasing demands of a rapidly-expanding enterprise gradually forced
the floodgates further ajar, and the released floodwaters, turbulent and
divagatious, meandered across an unsurveyed expanse. The topography was
undelineated, the undulations unperiphrased, the thalweg obscured, the
contour unsealed.
The primeval plats and formulas of the barnacle-encrusted manor rolls
and yearbooks, pleas rolls and commentaries of a yesteryear proved unrevealing as to the thickness of the seams and the depths of the indentations

in the terrene configuration. The tyro of legalistics was unassisted by leafing through his book of theorems or scanning his table of logarithms. The
table of contents of his legalistic calculus was void of precedents. In the
*Draftsman of the Oklahoma Business Corporation Act and the proposed Florida
Business Corporation Act and Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
1. "The first book to treat private corporations as such was the American text,
AMES ON CORPORATIONS, published in 1831... . The development took place
from 1800 to 1850 along rather definite lines. The most important of these developments were: (1) the evolving of the concept of the private corporation, an organization
run purely for profit, and (2) the advent of the general incorporation statutes ...
So, at the middle of the last century, we find in existence numerous corporations, made
up largely as follows: (1) many munioipal corporations, of course, (2) a number of
eleemosynary (non-stock) corporations, (3) most important, the quasi-public companies,
(4) numerous New England manufacturing companies, and (5) a small scattering of
other corporations. . . . However, it was not until 1848 in New York and 1851 in Massachusetts that we find full-fledged general incorporation statutes enacted in these two
states." Wright, The Oklahoma Corporation Law-Does It Need Revision? 7 OxL.
ST. B.. 224, 225-26 (1937).
"By 1850 a general law permitting incorporation for a limited business purpose had
The first constitutional provision requiring incorporation under
become common .....
general laws seems to be that in the New York Constitution of 1846-Art. 8, §1."
Brandeis, J., in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933).
Following the passage of the "Bubble Act" in 1719, little encouragement was offered
to new English commercial companies until the adoption of the Companies Act of 1856.
See Horrwitz, Historical Development of Company Law, 62 L. Q. REV. 375 (1946);
\'right and Baughman, Past and Present Trends in Corporation Law: Is Florida in
Step? 2 MIAMI L. Q. 69 (1947); DuBors, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE
BUBBI.E ACT, 1720-1800 (1938).
ANCELL AND
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nullibicity of a dragoman and cicerone, his scroll of hieroglyphics was fallow
and unportentious in gauging the necessary contour of the flume consigned
to the conveyance of the spawning progeny of the newly formulated concept of the strictly private corporation. Moreover, the lentoral emanations
of judicial decisions were much too laggard and phlegmatic to effectively
serve in piloting the advance of the current-surging and rampant as it
gradually became-in its uncharted course through an unexplored terraneY2
As a consequence, the task of gybing the masted sails guiding The Ship
Enterprise along the crest of the turgid flow became primarily legislative.
The initial channel was narrow, the bed shallow, the course winding,
the banks agee. But at repeated stages the jostling particles of the swirling
crest with accelerated momentum successively gnawed away the statutory
banks, experimentally established (often without plan or prediction) in an
effort to confine the ever-expanding current within its course. Thereby the
protractile channel was accretively widened and deepened. Recurring outpourings, progressive and more magnitudinous each time as they were,
compelled new and repeated charting and recharting of the channel's course.
Each periodic dilation of the statutory channel-even disregarding the
accompanying substantial lag-served to establish only a degree of equilibrium and conformity between a day-to-day folk-spirit of an expanding enterprise and a temporary legal pattern.
This process prevailed unchallenged for three-fourths of a century. But
the banks had proved to be less repellent in some places and more adaniantean in others. Consequently, the erosion varied, causing greater and
greater indentations, protuberances and other deformities. Depth and shallowness, eddies and rapids jargogled the current and ruffled the flow. The
repetitious process of piecemeal statutory amendments failed to buttress
the banks, but instead resulted in a patched-up, clumsy, incoherent mass of
shoreline. 3 This patch-work of incongruities hampered the verity in predicting the rate of effusion or the route of descent.
There was, in the meanwhile, a growing consciousness that the height
of the headwater recorded by the water gauge of the reservoir of our rapidly
2. "Legal sanctions directing a rapidly expanding industrial economy must by neces-

sity be shaped by legislative enactment. Court-made law is too uncertain, too slow, too
unwieldy, too expensive. Judicial precedents are lacking; customs and unwritten law
are scant and uncrystallized. Ancient utterances of Bracton, Littleton, Coke, and Blackstone are of little value as a guide in working satisfactory judicial solutions of modern
business problems.

Statutes have become the prime medium of development."

Wright

and Baughman, supra note 1, at 98.
"Most of the outstanding changes in corporation law during the last fifty years
have been due to or vitally affected by the legislative enactments which have come into
being during that period, and an article covering in adequate fashion these statutory
developments would tell a large part of the story of what has taken place in American
business corporation law during the last half century." Dodd, Statutory Developments
in Business CorPorationLaw 1886-1936, 50 HARv. L. Rev. 27 (1936).

3. See n.2 suPra. See also Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation
Statutes, 22 VAsH. U.L.Q. 350 (1937); same, 3 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 273 (1937); Wright
and Baughman, supra note 1.
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expanding modern enterprise was with equal accuracy registering the state
of our social progress, and with the hand of the hydraulic meter spinning
faster and faster as the water, puissant and accelerative, poured from the
spillway, the need for a more efficient method of controlling and guiding
its patulous course became critically evident. Before the shadows of the
dawn of the present century had appreciably shortened, the concept of a
scientifically planned new channel was procreated, and plans for effecting
its utilization were soon in the process of preparation. With plans drafted,
course platted, and incline scaled, corps of engineers promptly had in progress the construction of an imposing canal, straight in contour, expansive
in width and depth, smooth of surface, unifonn in declivity. Thus,
after much dint and toil through a tedious period of incubation an aggressive rival to the previously unchallenged maladroit method of development
of statutory corporation law was established.4 By a backward glance over a
short quarter-century span, we observe the first of the series of such projects
completed, and the surging current being shunted into the new chasmal
raceway, architectural in design and scatheless in lineament. With the evulsive process consummated, the new channel utilized, the old course plenarily
abandoned, we are now shifting from a parable in hydraulics to a discourse
in verities.
The first step in this swing from the accretive to the evulsive method
of progress in the development of statutory formulas aimed at mastering
unsolved legal corporate problems was the adoption of a modern business
corporation act in Ohio in 1927.5 The following year the final draft of the
U.B.C.A. (Uniform Business Corporation Act) was released." The sudden
lunge of this new competitor already betokened an approaching state of
stern rivalry between it and the established amendatory process for mastery
of this field of jurisprudence. Before this struggle for dominance got well
under way, a state of vigorous emulation among the respective new modem
acts was also in the offing. Thus, as these acts vied with the pseudo-orthodox amendatory process, they in turn carried on a badgering contest for
supremacy among themselves.
The Ohio B.C.A. was devoid of any national organizational support.
This, at least in part, accounts for- the fact that no future drafts were
closely patterned aftet it, although it did exert much influence upon future
4. "Although the first modern corporation act was not enacted into law until nearly
two decades later, as early as 1909 the National Conferr:.ce of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws began preparing the groundwork for such a uniform act. A 'Model Act' was finally
completed and was approved and released in 1928." Wright and Baughman, supra note
1, at 99.
5. See Marshall, Experiences in the Revision of Corporation Laws, Ky. S.B.A. 138
(1929); Davies, Reflections of the Amateur Draftsmen of the Ohio General Corporation
Act, 12 Wis. L. Rav. 487 (1937). The Ohio Act was drastically revised in 1939 (see
Lattin, Streamlining the Ohio Corporation-The 1939 Amendments, 6 Oiio ST. L.J. 123
[1940]) and again in 1949 (see Goldman, Recent Developments in Ohio Corporation
Law, 24 OHio BAR 180 [1951]).
6. See Commissioners' Notes, UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 49 et. seq. (1951); Wilson,
The Uniform Business Corporation Act, I TEx. L. & LEcs. 309 (1947).
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code-drafting committees. On the other hand, the U.B.C.A., with the backing of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, moved
out well in front in the harrowing marathon. Moreover, its streamlined
form, logical arrangement, articulate phraseology and neoterical noni~nclature seasoned it with a flavor which was strongly appealing. In rapid succession acts closely patterned after it were adopted in Louisiana (I928),.
Idaho (1929)," and Washington (1934)Y Furthermore, the Minnesota Act
(1933),o although to a lesser degree, followed it quite closely in form and
content, while Kentucky (1946)" enacted a major portion of it with numerous changes. fle trend, however, during the last few years seems to
indicate that the U.B.C.A. has run its course. The blight of obsolescence
has forced it to drop out of the competitive race, except as a moderate
factor of influence.
In 1931 California adopted a modern B.C.A.' 2 In planning it, the
architects platted a new channel, the blueprints of which revealed a tectonic
design quite dissimilar to the patterns displayed in prior cyanotypes. Like
7. See Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928, 2 LA. L. Rev. 597
(1940).
8. See Hawley, The New Corporation Code, IDA. S.B.A. 69 (1929).
9. See Ayer, The New Washington Business Corporation Act, 8 WAsH. L. REV. 97
and 147 (1934); 9 WAsH. L. REV. 1 (1934); Uniform Business Corporation Act and the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 5 WAsH. L. REV. 170 (1930).
10. See Hoshour, The Proposed Corporation Code, 17 MINN. L. REV. (Supp.) 113
11932); Hoshour, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, 17 MINN. L. REv. 689
3933); 18 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1933); Solether and Jennings, The Minnesota Business
orporation Act, 12 Wis. L. REV. 419 (1937); Colman and Finn, Comparison of the
Business Corporation Law of Minnesota and Delaware, 22 Mim. L. REV. 661 (1938).
11. 'he Kentucky Act followed substantially the provisions of Sections 1 to 48 of
the U.B.C.A., but major variations and omissions were effected in drafting the other 21
sections of the Act. Many new amendments were also added in 1948.
12. See Ballantine, Problems in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 17 A.B.A.J.
579 (1931); Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19
CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1931); Loeb, Revision of the Corporation Laws of California: State
Bar Completes Important Public Service, 19 A.B.A.1. 679 (1933); Sterling, Modernizing

California's Corporation Laws, 12 Vis. L. Rv. 453 (1937);

BALLANTINE,

CALIFORNIA

(1932); BALLANTINE AND STERLING, CAILIFORNIA CORPORATION
LAws (1938 Ed.); id, (1949 Ed.).
In the middle twenties, steps were taken to get the process of the modernization of
the California corporation laws under way. Numerous amendments were made in 1927
and 1929. See Ballantine, Legislative Developments in Corporation Law, 15 CALIF. L.
REv. 422 (1927); Ballantine, Plans for a Modernized Incorporation Law, 16 CA.LI. L.
REV. 425 (1928); Ballantine, Changes in the California Laws (1929), 17 CALIF. L. REv.
529 (1929); California's New Corporation Amendments, 16 VA. L. REV. 833 (1930).
Because of drastic constitutional restrictions placed on corporations, it was necessary to
effect an amendment of the California Constitution before enacting the general code of
1931. Moreover, numerous later amendments were added to the corporation statutes,
including a complete rearrangement and renumbering of the corporation laws in 1947,
since that time. Sce especially Buhler, The 1947 California Corporation Code--and
Other Corporation Legislation, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 423 (1947); Loomis, California
Code Amendments: Work of the 1949 California Legislature, 23 So. CALIF. L. REV.
12 (1949).
New or drastically revised acts were adopted in several other states at about this
time. Mississippi adopted a new corporation act in 1928. Although much less comprehensive than the truly "Modern Acts," it removed many archaic provisions contained in
its former statutes. See Chambers, The New Corporation Act, I Miss. L. 1.54 (1928);
Roberds, The New CorporationAct, 2 Miss. L. J. 179 (1929). In 1929, Tennessee also
CORPORATION

LAWS
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the Ohio Act, it has not served as an archetype in drafting other codes,
although its provisions exerted much influence in the formulation of portions of the Oklahoma Act.
By 1933 the tournament was well under way. That year, along with
Minnesota, Illinois' 3 and Pennsylvania' 4 also entered the contest as challengers of the supremacy of the previous entrants. rhe Illinois model B.C.A.
evidenced the qualities, temporary at least, of a favored contender. Already
the Pennsylvania Committee had procured a copy of the preliminary draft
of the Illinois Act and bad, with various modifications, fashioned the features of the Pennsylvania model from this appropriated blueprint. The
second state to accept the pattern formulated by Illinois was Missouri.' 5
Although the modern act adopted in 1941 by that state contained a flood
of amendments, some of which were added to escape the rigid constitutional
limitations which had by necessity restricted the scope of the Illinois Act,
its general contour and content was shaped after the Illinois draft.
In the meanwhile, George S. Hills released a stripped-down model act
in 1935.1 This new version contained many advanced features, especially
in the way of safeguards aimed at protecting the corporate assets against unwarranted dissipation. Then, in 1937, the Kansas' 7 corporation laws underwent a thorough revision, establishing a degree of modernity in the statutory law of that state. While Missouri was busy introducing its new code,
adopted a new corporat-ion act. It followed the Delaware provisions quite closely although
it was less comprehensive and many of the more liberal features of the Delaware statutes
were omitted. See Fowler, Some Features of Tennessee's 1929 Corporation Act, 8
TENN. L. REV. 3 (1929).
The same year Michigan adopted a drastically revised corporation code, containing many advanced features. See James, The New Michigan Corporation Act, 11 Micn. S.B.I. 187 (1931). Indiana also enacted a semi-modem, streamlined
corporation act in 1929. See Dix, The Indiana General Corporation Act, 5 IND. L.J.
107 (1929).
13. See Johnson, Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends in Corporation Law, 19
A.B.A.J. 631 (1933); same, ILL. S.B.A. 189 (1933); Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U. oF Ciii. L. REV. 357 (1934); Little, The Illinois
Business Corporation Act, 28 ILL. L. REv. 997 (1934); Katz, The Illinois Business Corporation Act, 12 WIs. L. REV. 473 (1937); Fitzgerald, Outstanding Developments in
Corporation Law, ILL. S.B.A. 108 (1937).
14. See Shockley, Revision of the Corporation Laws of Pennsylvania, 11 PENN.
B.A.Q. 23 (1932); Sullivan, Development of Corporation Law in Pennsylvania, 7 Ar. L.
SCHOOL REV. 1170 (1934); Metzger, The Business Corporation Law, 38 DICK. L. REV.
77 (1934); Shockley, The BusinesF Corporation Law in Operation, 19 PENN. B.A.Q. 197
(1934).
15. See Cowherd, A Modern Corporate Business Code for Missouri, 14 Mo. B.I. 7-8,
14-15, and 24 (1943); Kallenbach and Cowherd, The New General and Business Cortoration Act: A Report to the Association, 14 Mo. B.J. 300-2, and 304-7 (1943); Cowherd, Missouri Modernizes Her Business Corporation Code, 12 KAN. CITY L. REV. 89
(1944).
16. Model Corporation Act, 48 H1AKV. L. REV. 1334 (1935). Any committee engaged in drafting a modern business corporation code cannot afford to overlook the many
advanced provisions suggested by Mr. Hills.
17. See Lee, Memorandum Explaining Differences between Corporation Code and
Existing Statutes, 7 [.B.A. KAN. 260 (1939); Lee, Some Questions Which Have Arisen
in Connection with the Corporation Code, 8 J.B.A. KAN. 352 (1940); Litowich, Practice
Under the New Corporation Code, 10 J.B.A. KAN. 134 (1941).
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Nebraska,' 8 in 1941, was also engaged in effecting a modernization of its
corporation statutes. The Nebraska Act, subject to required modifications
owing to restrictions in the Nebraska Constitution, followed closely the
Delaware statutes.
With the addition of Kentucky to its list in 1946, the U.B.C.A. had
marshalled a total of five adherents, counting Minnesota as such, while the
Illinois B.C.A. could claim but two (three, by including Illinois). But
efforts to breathe new life into the lagging influence of the latter were then
well under way. The original Illinois draft had been prepared by a committee consisting mainly of representatives of the local Chicago bar, with
the very able Mr. Millard B. Kennedy serving as chairman. In 1940 the

personnel of this local committee assumed a new role.' 9 With little change
in membership it had become the Committee on Business Corporations of
the American Bar Association, with Mr. Kennedy continuing as chairman.
The Committee, operating under this new banner, revised the 1933 Illinois
draft, and in its refurbished fonn, released itas a "Model for State Business
Corporation Acts" of the American Bar Association in 1946.20 The new
version was more or less a restatement of the former act. Some of the restrictions which had been necessary in the Illinois Act in order to conform
to the constitutional limitations in that state were eliminated. One desirable
change in terminology was made by sbstituting "capital surplus" for the
term "paid-in surplus." Some other additions and omissions were effected,
but the process was largely a matter of re-editing, principally by rearrangements in phraseology; the general contour remained unchanged. The new
product was little more than a revision by the Committee of its own draft
enacted in Illinois thirteen years earlier. As later expressed by Mr. Ray
Garrett, who had been advanced from a member of the Committee to the
18. See Ricie and Vold, The General Corporation Law of Nebraska, 21 NEB. L.

197 (1942).
19. "Members of the Committee at that time [1943] were Alphonse A. LaPorte of

REv.

New York, Charles N. Orr of St. Paul, and Millard B. Kennedy, Whitney Campbell and
myself of Chicago. The drafting devolved upon the Chicago members who obtained
approval of the other members through correspondence." Garrett, History, Purpose and
Surnmary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus. LAWYER 1 (1950).
"Itmust be said that the Committee of the Chicago Bar Association wrote the law
in all of its essential provisions." Little, The Illinois Business Corporation Act, 28 ILL.
L. Rav. 997 (1934).
20. "Upon the completion of the Federal Act, the Committee was requested to preprepare a similar act suitable for state use. After three more years of study, an initial
draft was submitted in a report to the Section [of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association] in 1946 and published under the title 'Model for
State Business Corporation Acts.'
The members of the Committee whose names
appeared in that report were Professor William E. Britton of Illinois, Frederick V.
Brune of Baltimore, Professor E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard, George C. Seward of New
York, Greenbcrry Simmons of Louisville, Professor John E. Tracy of Michigan, and the
three Chicago members [see note 19] already mentioned. Again, the drafting devolved
upon the Chicago members, who consulted the other members largely by correspondence
....When the initial draft of the Model Act was reported to the Section, the Committee
knew that it was incomplete in some respects and required much further intensive study
and careful editing." Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business
Corporation Act, 6 Bus. LAwYER 1 (1950).
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chairmanship upon the death of Mr. Kennedy in 1947, "The drafting devolved upon the Chicago members who obtained approval of the other
members through correspondence."
This revision did not seem to materially enhance the prestige of the
original draft of the 1933 Illinois Act. Its promulgators, with some feeling
of disappointment over their first revisionary attempt, immediately undertook a second diaskeuasis of the draft. The draft in its newly-revised form
was released late in 1950 as the "Model Business Corporation Act (Revised)," by the American Bar Association. 2 1 This second revision composed
another still more drastic process of re-editing consisting largely of a rearrangement of the context and phraseology. Only a few further changes
in substantive content were effected, although some minor additions were
made-especially in expanding the general corporate powers.
This 1950 reburnishment, coupled with the vigorous national support
of the American Bar Association, 2 2 seemed to inject into the re-revised draft
21. "Following Mr. Kennedy's death the Committee was reorganized, and assumed
the task of editing and completing the initial draft. In the process, the entire Act has
been revised and improved in language, coordination, style and arrangement. The result
is the Model Act now before you ....
The Chicago members again have acted as drafters
of the revisions .... The three professors who were formerly members of the Committee
felt obliged to retire some months ago and we have not had the benefit of their recent
council and advice." Ibid.
22. There was a wide distribution of the November, 1950, issue (Vol. VI, No. 1) of
the BusiNEss LAWYER (published by the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the A.B.A.), carrying the full text of the 1950 Model Business Corporation Act,
along with an enthusiastic introduction, entitled "History, Purpose and Summary of the
Model Business Corporation Act," by the Committee Chairman, Mr. Garrett. On page 2
of his introduction, Mr. Garrett states, "Others may be assured that it is impossible to study
and compare the statutes of all 48 states and, because of their wide diversity, almost
impossible to select a mere few for the purpose."
In response to that, this author wishes to state that he, in preparing the Oklahoma
draft, read, analyzed, and carded every provision in every section and subsection in all
of the corporation statutes in 59 jurisdictions. The 17,000 summary cards completely
covered the corporation statutes of the 48 states, the District of Columbia, and the four
territories (Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Philippine Islands), and the Companies
Acts of England, New Zealand, New South Wales, South Africa, India, and Canada.
The cards were assembled according to subject matter, and no provision of the Oklahoma
Act was drafted without having all of the cards relating to any matter pertaining thereto
in the 59 jurisdictions spread out on a table and examined before reducing the provision
to writing. See Wright, The Proposed Florida Business Corporation Act-The Modus
Operandi Employed in PreparingIt and Other Similar Modern Codes, 26 FLA. L.J. 259
(1952).
Mr. Garrett further states, "The Committee believes that the organization of subject
matter in the Model Act is the best that can be devised." Further, on p. 5, he says,
"There is no existing corporate statute comparable to the Model Act on this subject."
Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus.
LAWYER 1 (1950).
This author is not a novice in drafting corporation codes, and he frankly admits
that lie does not believe that a single section that he has ever drafted has reached the
ultimate and is "the best that can be devised." Nor does he agree with the second statement of Mr. Garrett.
The A.B.A. Committee seems to have dominated the Wisconsin Committee in
preparation of the Wisconsin Act. That Committee's report (The New Wisconsin
Business Corporation Code: Comments by Drafting Committee, 24 Wis. B. BULL. 30
E19511) repeats much of the identical matter set out in Garrett's introductory statements.
The A.B.A. Committee seems to have exerted a like influence over the Texas
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a more vigorous appeal, although its form and substantive content varied
only slightly from the original 1933 Illinois Act. The original release of the
U.B.C.A. antedated the Illinois Act by five years. However, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws had failed to offer any
form of a subsequently-revised draft.
This "new appeal" of the Illinois Act resulting from this added impetus
seems to have supplied the Illinois progeny with the differential necessary
for crowding out the early competitors. Although a Wisconsin committee,
headed by Dean Lloyd K. Garrison of the University of Wisconsin Law
School, 23 labored diligently through the middle thirties on a new business
corporation draft for that state, the 1951 Wisconsin Legislature brushed
that work aside and adopted without appreciable changes the A.B.A. revised
version of the 1933 llinois Act.2 4 Also, the Maryland business corporation
laws were thoroughly revised last year. The Maryland Committee, in preparing its new draft, relied heavily on the A.B.A. Model Act for its advanced
provisions, but carried over, in revised form, a large portion of the provisions
25
of the former Maryland statutes.
In this field, as in the sphere of business, new competitors were certain
Committee. Mr. Carrington, Chairman of the Texas Committee, is also a member of
the Committee on Corporate Laws of the A.B.A. In the .letter addressed "To the
Lawyers of the State of Texas," as an introduction to the Proposed Texas Business Corporation Act, Revision of October 12, 1951, the Texas Committee states (p. IV), "In
April we had the benefit of spending two full days in discussion of the draft, article by
article, with the members of the American Bar Association Committee heretofore mentioned, who came to Dallas for that purpose." Moreover, the A.B.A. Committee, upon
hearing that Florida was considering the adoption of a modern business corporation code,
wrote to this State urging that the A.B.A. Committee should help formulate the Florida
proposed draft.
It is suggested that the American Bar Association is rendering a distinct disservice
in its effort to choke off any further attempts to improve upon the development of
statutory corporation law. The conceptual paragons of Ballantine and Dodd, Garrison
and Crane, Jennings and James are more than a genre of a fabliau. Any concerted effort
to beset or screen their etchings can but hamper a progressive statutory development. See
CAnIOZo, ThE GROWTH OF THE LAw, pp. 11 et seq. (1924). Furthermore, the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute has joined in the
promotion of the A.B.A. Model Business Corporation Act. That committee's method of
"continuing legal education" may meet with some opposition of the legal educators in
the field of corporation law.
23. See Garrison, Proposed Redraft of the Wisconsin Corporation Laws, 12 Wis.
L. REv. 417 (1937).
24. "On August 6, 1951, the Governor signed Bill 763-S which enacts the new
Business Corporation Code for Wisconsin recommended to the Legislative Council by
committees of the State and Milwaukee Bar Associations .... The Code does not become
effective as to \Visconsin corporations until July 1, 1953, unless prior to that date they
elect to become subject thereto. New corporations may be organized under either the
present law or under the new code until July 1, 1953." The New Wisconsin Business
Corporation: Comments by Drafting Committee, 24 Wis. B. BULL. 30 (1951). See
also Young, Some Comments on the New Wisconsin Business Corporation Law, 1952
Wis. L. REv. 5.
25. Although the Maryland Act approaches an entirely new corporation code, owing
to the fact that not more than 25 to 30 per cent of its content is new to the corporation
laws of that state, it can better be classified as a "drastic revision." Some 40 or 50 per
cent of the new matter comes from the A.B.A. draft, while the balance of the new
provisions in part came from other sources and in part was formulated by the drafting
committee. Thus, something like 12 per cent of fresh content came from the A.B.A.
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to crop up. The latest rival in this realm was the 1947 Oklahoma B.C.A.2"
Although it was not afforded institutional support, such as the national
backing supplied to the U.B.C.A. and A.B.A. Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American Bar Association, respectively, it may prove to be a worthy contestant. If this presumption is well-founded, the Illinois Act (as refurbished and supported by the
A.B.A.) and the Oklahoma Code appear to be the only remaining principal
contenders. Although the Oklahoma Act differs drastically in scope, form,

arrangement, content, and nomenclature from any other one act, the rivalry
results quite largely from the difference in the modus operandi employed in
drafting the respective acts. Since this author has had an occasion to com27
ment on the elaborate methods utilized in drafting the Oklahoma Code,
only a brief description of that process will be made herein.
The drafts of two new modern business corporation acts are now reposing in the hands of legislative interim committees of Florida28 and
Texas29 awaiting consideration by the 1953 sessions of the respective legislatures. In the one instance, the committee that prepared the Florida draft
has employed the same methods as followed in formulating the Oklahoma
Act, while, in the other, the Texas Committee has resorted to a much
simpler process. The latter committee selected the American Bar Association's 1950 version of the Illinois Act as the basis for its new act. It then,
section by section, went through it, making revisionary changes by weaving
provisions. The Act evidences a vigorous attempt by the Maryland Committee to formulate a code suited to the needs and traditions of Maryland.
26. The Oklahoma Act, like the proposed Florida B.C.A., is more in the nature of
a "code" than a single "act." The aim of the Committee was to fully codify the general
law relating to corporations. The scope of the code is articulate and comprehensive.
However, the Oklahoma Act, as adopted by the Legislature, falls far short of being a
"model" for a 1953 code. In fact, at the time of its enactment it was not in the best
possible form. This resulted from several causes, viz., (1) many provisions were products
of committee compromises, (2) several matters were by-passed owing to the fact that
the Committee was unable to formulate provisions acceptable to a committee majority,
(3) local concepts, (4) constitutional limitations not common in other states, (5) inconsistencies resulting from ill-advised amendments added by the legislators, and (6) future
needs were not adequately anticipated.
27. Wright, The Proposed Florida Business Corporation Act - The Modus Operandi
Employed in PreparingIt and Other Similar Modern Codes, 26 FLA. L.J. 84 (1952).
28. The proposed Florida Act was introduced in the 1951 Session of the Florida
Legislature, but, owing to the pressure of prior pending legislation, time did not permit a
thorough study of the proposed code by the legislators. As a result, Concurrent Resolution No. 15, commending the work of the Committee and placing the draft in the
hands of a joint committee for study and recommendation to the 1953 Session of the
Legislature, was jointly adopted by the two Houses.
29. "As the only interim committee of the Texas Legislature, appointed at its last
session, a strong committee on the subject is headed by John Ben Sheppard, Secretary of
State. On this committee are seven lawyer members of the House appointed by the
Speaker, and seven members of the State Bar Committee appointed by the Governor."
State Bar Committee, Corporation Act, 14 TEx. B.J. 653 (1951).
See also State Bar Committee, Revision of Corporation Laws, 14 TEx. B.J. 345;
Carrington, Business Corporation Act, 14 TEx. B. I . 399; Balsheim, The Need for Revising the Texas Corporation Statutes, 27 TEX. L. REV. 659 (1949); Baily, Need for Revision of Texas Corporation Statutes, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1950); Bickel, What a Model
Corporation Act Should Contain (Address), 13 Tax. B.J. 183 (1950).
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in many provisions, in so far as deemed desirable, from the existing statutes
of Texas and a few other states. :15 In nomenclature, form, arrangement and
scope, it substantially follows the 1933 Illinois Act. Moreover, not to mention the current and predictable future demands of modern enterprise, it,
in substantive content, reveals very little of the evolutionary progress in the
development of statutory law during the last two decades.
Owing to the fact that the proposed acts of Florida and Texas are in
the same stage of advancement, the lines of distinction between the Florida
and Texas drafts will be hereinafter analyzed and compared. However,
since the Wisconsin Act followed the A.B.A. draft more closely, the picture
of these two theories of code drafting possibly might be slightly more clearcut if we were to contrast the Florida draft with the \Visconsin Code.
Since the functional purposes to be attained in the formulation of a
modern business corporation code has been adequately set out by this and
other authors in previous comments,"1 that matter will be mentioned only
casually here. However, there are what we might call general objectives
which are to be pursued in formulating a comprehensive modem business
corporation act. It is the belief of this author that three such general objectives must serve as the ultimate goal in such an undertaking. The first
of these objectives should be to comb the entire field of statutory corporation law, 32 and, after analyzing, evaluating and sorting out the most accurate
and conplete existing concepts, to restate them in the best possible form
and phraseology. The second step should be to study the new problems and
30. In addition to the A.B.A. and Illinois Acts, the Texas Committee lists statutes
serving as sources of its provisions as follows: Texas 25, Ohio 7, Delaware 6, Oklahoma
6, New York 3, California 2, and Colorado, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin I each. The Committee could Well afford to give more attention to the U.B.C.A.,
Hills's Model Act, and the Oklahoma Code.
31. "'he ideal corporation act should have the following characteristics: clarity, completeness, flexibility and adequate protection of the interests of the public and of minority
shareholders against abuses of corporate power. '[he act should be clear so that practicing lawyers will not have to guess at its meaning nor indulge in litigation to obtain interpretations. It should be complete in the sense that it furnishes to lawyers and businessmen answers to all corporate questions for which statutory provision is feasible. It should
be sufficiently flexible to meet the modern needs of business, but still provide adequate
protection against abuses of corporate power." Bickel, What A Model Corporation Act
Should Contain, 13 T'ux. B.J. 183 (1950).
"A good corporation statute should observe the following principles: 1. . . . consistency. 2 ... flexihility consistent with safety.... .... .even balance between freedom
of administrative control and safety for the shareholders' investment. 4. . . . safety of the
shareholders' investment . . . not . . . at the expense of the . . . public. 5. Safeguards
for shareholders and creditors . . . not constitute dangerous pitfalls for . . . shareholders.
6. . . . requiring intelligence, fidelity, and honesty in the administration . . . not scare
away the very qualities it seeks to promote, 7. . . . preserving the just rights of the
minority shareholders, . . . not . . , sacrifice the just rights of the majority. 8. . . . protecting creditors . . . not permit . . . destruction of the shareholders' property by . . .

creditors. 9. . . . couched in language so precise that little is left for judicial interpretation." Little, The Illinois Business Corporation Law, 28 ILL. L. REV. 997, 998 (1934).
See also Wright, Protection of Creditors Under the Proposed Florida Business Corporation Act, 6 MiAmi L.Q. 192 (especially note 2) (1952).
32. Note the procedure set out in Wright, The Proposed Florida Business Corporation Act-The Modus Operandi Employed In Preparing It and Other Similar Modern
Codes, 26 FA. L.J. 259 (1952).
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tension-points revealed by current cases, commentaries and commercial and
industrial demands, and to draft provisions in an effort to work out a statutory solution as to each of these new problems, along with the older questions
and queries remaining only partially answered or comlletely unsolved. The
third objective is' to be accomplished by making as complete a study of
possible future trends in the evolution of the needs of our modern-day enterprise and then by projecting the mind out into the future try to develop
statutory formulas which would at least give the businessman and indusmay safely
trialist a hint or clue for aiding them in predicting how they
33
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This broader theory was pursued in the formulation of the Oklahoma
and Florida drafts, while all of the other drafts promulgated since Hills's
Model Act of 1935 have been aimed almost entirely at accomplishing only
the first of these objectives. In fact, \Visconsin did not attempt that much.
The Wisconsin Committee made no endeavor to examine the entire field
of existing statutory corporation law; nor was any effort made to sift out the
best available provisions and weave them into a new formulation of statutory
principles. It merely seized upon the A.B.A. 1950 draft and accepted it as
the ultimate 3' and adopted it with few material changes. Thus, the Wisconsin Act cannot be considered as an up-to-date restatement of modem
statutory corporation law. It was tainted with a shade of obsolescence at
the date of its inception. The Texas diaskeuasts have accomplished a more
pronounced revision of the A.B.A. draft, although it also falls far short of
a truly modern synoptical corporation code.
On the other hand, the Oklahoma Committee started off by carding
every provision in the corporation statutes of fifty-nine Anglo-American
jurisdictions, along with the U.B.C.A. and Hills's Model Act. Not a single
section, subsection, or provision of the preliminary draft was formulated
without first examining and studying all the cards of the 59 jurisdictions
that were assembled on the point involved. Moreover, included in this collection, were thousands of cards on case-materials and commentaries shedding light upon each provision drafted. Although the cards relating to the
provisions in the modem acts were scanned most carefully, the source of
the concepts adopted, along with the phraseology employed in expressing
them, were not limited to any one particular source. Furthernmore, all of the
leadiig authorities skilled in the drafting of corporation codes were called
upon to lend suggestions, constructive criticisms and other assistance in
shaping the contents and arrangement of the subject matter in the proposed
33. Lacking legal formulas to serve as a guide, modern corporations are placed in a
position similar to what a football team would face if it were to be engaged in a game
before the rules of the game had been fornulated and a rule book compiled. It would
be awkward indeed to proceed with a football game, leaving the governing regulations to
be formulated after alleged infractions had been committed. It certainly would slow up
the game. Is the result not the same with corporate enterprise?
34. See Young, Some Comments on the New Wisconsin Business Corporation Law,

1952 Wis. L.

REV.

5, 6.
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code insofar as they could be induced to collaborate in the undertaking.
Something like two-score of experts, including several members of the original Illinois Committee," ' contributed valuable suggestions. As a result,
the draft was much more comprehensive, more universal, more modern than
it would otherwise have been.
The same method has been reemployed in formulating the Florida proposed draft except that the time element did not prmit a general solicitation
of criticisms and suggestions concerning its form, content, etc., by outside
authorities. Profesor Ballantine alone was called upon for assistance in aiding
the Committee in its decisions on some controversal points. It must be
born in mind, however, that the Florida draft is more than a diaskeuasis of
the Oklahoma Act. All new developments, since the preparation of the
Oklahoma draft, in the entire fields of statutory corporation law of Florida
and the other fifty-eight jurisdictions and the four model acts (the U.B.
C.A., Hills's and the 1946 and 1950 A.B.A. drafts) were analyzed and evaluated. Later comments and cases were examined, and problems, recent,
current, and anticipatory, were fully considered. A few new features were
borrowed from the 1950 A.B.A. draftS and from the more recent amendments in other acts. [he general subject matter was rearranged and many

new formulas were devised to serve as a guide in meeting new problems,
present and of the near future. If no new developments concerning the
particular topic, actual or anticipated, were discovered, corresponding provisions of the Oklahoma Act were transplanted without change, while others
were restated so as to better conform to more recent concepts, and to meet
new or changed circumstances. Accordingly, the Florida draft is more than
a hash-over of the Oklahoma Act. Portions of the Oklahoma draft considered as questionable or unfitted to the legal and practical conditions of
Florida were deleted, others were re-drafted, and many new features, untouched in other acts, were added. This draft is now undergoing a final
revision so that it will in fact be a 1953-model when presented to next

year's legislature.
Corporate management has b&n free in its criticism of law as being
laggard. Such criticism is well-founded. Uncertain corporation law is bad
law. If corporation laws are spotty, vague, and uncertain corporate managemeiit is stymied, and commerce and industry are retarded. Unnecessary
litigation, with its attending expense and uncertainty, is shunned by corporate administrators. It must be kept in mind that, in the absence of a
degree of predictability as to the legal consequences that may follow an
act, corporations generally refrain from proceeding.
35. The late Mr. Millard B. Kennedy, Chairman of the Illinois Committee, extended
considerable assistance by personal interviews and correspondence. The extended assistance by the nein1bers of the Committees of California, Ohio and Minnesota was also of
-indispensable value.
36. Principal among these were the extension of the power of corporations to contribute to wartime, civic and eleemosynary activities. However, the Florida provisions

are much more comprelensive than those found in the A.B.A. draft.
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Enterprise is closely geared to the new developments in science and
inventions. At least, the lag is slight. Accordingly, statutory corporation
law should be kept, as nearly as possible, abreast of our commercial and
industrial progress. This, it has tragically failed to do. Modem enterprise
has progressed further since the adoption of the original Illinois B.C.A.
than it had advanced during any previous period twice as great in length.
Observe the various industrial advances in the various fields-aircraft, automotive, ordnance, radar, communications, refrigeration, air-conditioning,
television, atomic power, etc. Today no automotive or aircraft company
would consider reproducing a 1933-model craft. More than a reburnishing
of the ancient model would be required if current demands were to be met.
The principal fallacy in the procedure of the Texas Committee resulted
from the selection of a draft, to a degree already obsolete, as a basis for its
new work. If cyanotypes of previous decades do not serve as patterns in
the aircraft or automotive industries, likewise, obsolete concepts have no
place in shaping a modern corporation code. It is better to wipe the slate
clean, start from scratch, select the best from every possible source, and build
anew. Let's now shift from generalities to a more detailed comparison of
the salient features of these two proposed acts.
a. Form and Arrangement
The form of the Florida and Texas drafts are not too dissimilar, except
that the latter breaks the subject matter ip into Parts, Articles, Sections,

Paragraphs,. and Subparagraphs while the corresponding subdivisions of the
Florida Act are labelled Articles, Sections, Subsections, Paragraphs, and Subparagraphs. The Texas Act has only 136 articles (sections), while the Florida Act consists of 246 sections. The individual sections in the Florida
draft are longer and more comprehensive on the average than are the articles
in the Texas Act. However, the difference in the volume of the two codes
results primarily from two other causes, viz., the Florida Act has incorporated
in it the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, in revised form, " and seventy-five or
more sections deal with new matter. Nearly a third of the Florida Code
relates to current problems, many of which aye entirely new in statutory
law, while many others have not heretofore been reduced to statutory formulas except in the Oklahoma Act.
The principal difference in the arrangement of the two proposed acts
is that the Texas draft attempts to separate the substantive provisions from
the rest of the Act, placing 44 articles (sections) in Part Two. This would
37. Sections 93 to 123 deal with the transfer of shares and certificates evidencing
interests in shares. The Uniform Stock Tranfer Act was drastically revised and incorporated into the Oklahoma B.C.A. See Sections 1.85 to 1.110 and 1.114 to 1.120 of
18 OKLA. STAT. ANN.

The Oklahoma provisions on share transfers were again revised

and made a part of this Act. Subsection a of Section 114 of this Act has revised and
substituted IS FLA. STAr. ANN. § 614.24 for 18 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.109 (U.S.T.A.
§ 23), extending the application of the Act to shares whether allotted before or after
this Act becomes effective and to share option warrants or other certificates evidencing
the ownership or authority to represent shares.
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scem to be undesirable as it is bard to say what provisions arc "substantive"
ind what ones are "procedural." A careful examination of the Texas draft
reveals that there are substantive and semi-substantive provisions scattered
throughout the draft and many procedural matters are found in the substantive part. Only the Illinois Act and a few of the other acts patterned
after it have followed this arrangement. The general arrangement used in
the Florida draft and in the statutes of most jurisdictions is to follow a

logical sequence in the arrangement of the subject matter closely corresponding to the developmental steps through which the life of the corporation passes. Except for the effort of trying to segregate the so-called "substantive provisions," the Texas Act pursues such a general plan of arrangeincit.
b. Nomenclature
The Florida Act utilizes many modern terms which are not used in the
Texas draft. In the following contrast of corresponding terminology of the
two drafts, the term used by Florida is set out first, followed by nomenclature employed by Texas: allotnzent " of shares, issuance of shares; domestication5 " of a foreign corporation, procurement by a foreign corporation of a

certificate of authority to transact business in this State; certificates evidencing40 shares, certificates representing shares; attributes1 of shares, designations, preferences, limitations and relative rights of shares; constituent corporations of a merger or consolidation, the several corporationsparties to the
plan of a merger or consolidation; resulting corporation of a consolidation,
new corporation of a consolidation. Both drafts use surviving corporation
when referring to a mcrger. Also, both employ shares instead of stock and

38. The terms "allot" and "allotment" arc employed in the Uniform Act, the Busincss
Corporation Acts of Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Washington, and
the Companies Acts of England and the English Commonwealths. "Issue" is an ambiguous variable. Note the various meanings of the term in the following phrases: issue
orders, issue process, issue bonds, issue share certificates, issue shares, issue writs, date of
issue, general issue, collateral issue, feigned issue, common issue, birth of issue, issue in
fact, issue n law, issue roll, issum and profits, and issues on sheriffs. Confusion often
arises ill such legal expressions as "issue of stocks and bonds." Does "issue" there mean
"allotment of the stocks" or "issue of the share certificates?" See note 66, infra. 'lie
Texas courts have construed "issue of stock," as used in EX. CONSI'., Art. 12, § 6, to
mean issue of the share certificates. The term "allot" avoids such confusion.
Domesticated' and "domestication" as applied to corporations is easily under39.
stoodland adds brevity. These tenrs arc common il legal language, and are employed in
the Oklahoma Act and inl legal parlance in many other states.
40. "Evidencing," when used in relation to share certificates, is more accurate in
The California, Oklahoma and Florida Acts define the
umeaing than "representing."
phrase "to rcpresent shares" as meaning "to vote, to give written consent to corporate
action, to dissent thereto, and/or to execute waivers of notices of shareholders' meetings."
Applying such a definition, it would be incorrect to say that the share certificate "represents" the shares. As to the other terms and phrases contrasted, the matter resolves
itself into a question of choice, as in each instance the different forms of terminology are
in common use. The Florida Committee chose the terms combining greater clarity with
brevity.
41. The term "attributes" is a novation in the Oklahoma Act and the Florida draft,
serving the purpose of a general term to promote brevity.
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each also follows quite generally the other nomenclature used inthe other
modern acts.
c. General Content
The Texas short title reads: "This Act shall be known and may be cited
as the 'Texas Business Corporation Act'," while the short title of tle Florida draft states: "This Act shall be known, and may be cited, as the 'Florida
General Corporation Act', and is hereinafter referred to as 'this Act'." It is
to be noted that in revising the Florida preliminary draft the term "General"
has been substituted for "Business" in the title. The scope of the Florida
Act is broad and general. It applies to all types of corporations, profit and
non-profit, insofar as special provisions elsewhere in the statutes do not
conflict with its terms. The law of corporations can well be contained in
two chapters of the statutes. The first chapter should include all of the provisions relating to business corporations. There is no need for duplication.
Therefore, to the extent that the provisions of this chapter are equally applicable to other corporations, the provisions should be extended over so as
to govern all general matters relating to other types of corporations as well.
Then, the second chapter should be broken up into articles dealing with
non-profit, insurance, indemnity, banking, etc., corporations, and trust companies, credit unions, building and loan associations, cooperatives, etc.,
respectively. Each of such articles should only deal with matters specially
relating to such type of corporation, etc., respectively, allowing all general
matters concerning all corporations alike to be regulated by the first chapter.
The drafting of the second chapter in Florida will follow immediately the
adoption of the General Act. Then, in the future as any new class of corporation requiring special provisions is provided for, another article containing necessary special provisions may be added to the second chapter. The
need for reducing the special provisions relating to the respective special
types or classes of corporations to up-to-date form and content is equally
as imperative as the fornulation of a general corporation act.
The lengthy explanation of the divisions and subdivisions in framing
the Act, as set out in Article 1 of the Texas Act, seems to be redundant. A
glance at the Act reveals the divisional arrangement.
Section 2 of the Florida Act defines a total of 32 terms, while Article
2 of the Texas Act contains only 16 definitions. The Texas Committee
could well afford to redraft several of its definitions and omit several others.
"Corporation" and "domestic corporation" arc defined as one and the same.
Still the generic term, "corporation," is used over and over in the Act when
not referring to domestic corporations. Notice, for instance Article 107. In
the next definition, a "foreign corporation" is referred to as a corporation.
Therefore a foreign corporation means a domestic corporation as the terms
corporation and domestic corporation are defined as the same.
Florida defines "corporation," "domestic corporation," "foreign corporation," "domesticated corporation,"

"existing corporation," and "existing
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domesticated corporation." If a term has a variable meaning, is not substantive, can be reduced to an accurate definition, and is used more than
once in the Act, the verbiage will be reduced by defining it. If it is used
but once, it can be defined where used. The 32 terms defined in the Florida
Act are repeated several times in the Act. The Florida Committee felt that
some terms such as "articles of incorporation" (which Texas defines) can
well be omitted from the definitions section as the articles and their contents are fully described in the Act. Other terms defined bv Florida, but
not by Texas, are "promotion," "promoter," "incorporator,' 'allotment,"
"alottcd shares," "outstanding shares," "series," or "series of shares," "preemptive right," "share certificate," or "certificate of shares," "to represent
shares," "cumulative voting," "director," "dividend," "share dividend,"
"dividend preference," "redemptive price," "liquidation preference," "liquidation price," "assets," and "publication notice."
Florida defines a "subscription" as a contract, while Texas defines it as
a piece of paper, viz., a memorandum in writing. Under the Texas Act,
according to the definition, a subscription is only an offer and there could
not be such a thing as a binding subscription contracted after incorporation.
What is it if it isn't a subscription after an acceptance under Article 16, C?
The Texas definitions of "subscription" and "subscriber" are indeed confusing. They should be either redrafted or omitted. In the Texas Act,
" 'authorized shares' means the shares of all classes which a corporation
is
authorized to issue." In other words, "authorized shares" means "shares
authorized." It is bad form to use the term defined in defining the term.
Texas inaccurately defines "net assets," as there are deductions other than
debts. Also, its definition of "insolvency" is faulty. A corporation may not
be able to pay its debts the instant they become due and still not be insolvent. Suppose a debt becomes due at 3 P.M. on Friday and the corporation
has a million dollars in a safety deposit box at a bank and the bank had
closed for the weekend at 2 P.M. Moreover, a corporation might be insolvent when it is able to pay all its "debts as they become due" as there are
many financial obligations other than debts. The accounting terms defined
in the Texas Act are largely substantive and are variables which do not lend
themselves to one accurate definition. 42 The Florida Committee did hazard
the definition of "assets," by stating that "assets" means all of a corporation's
properties and rights of every sort capable of being listed or estimated in
terms of monetary value. This definition might offer some aid. At least, it
is believed to be accurate. The Texas definition of "stated capital" is substantive and duplicates substantive provisions over in the Act. See Article 19.
42. Mr. Fletcher Lewis of the Illinois Committee, while collaborating with the Okhoma Committee in the preparation of the Oklahoma B.C.A., in a letter of April 10,
1938, to this author, had this to say: "I should be inclined to proceed very cautiously
in making any statutory definition of earned surplus. The American Institute of Accountants as yet, after soma years of study, has not been able to agree upon a satisfactory
accounting definition of earned surplus, and to get a hard and fast statutory rule is likely

to lead to difficulty."
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The scope of the Texas Act is limited to corporations run for profit
other than banks, trust companies, insurance companies, cemetery coinpanies, cooperatives, and labor unions.4 \Vould it not be better to not
except these, but instead deal with them as planned by Florida?44 Many of
the provisions in a business corporation act are apropos in providing statu-

tory direction guiding and regulating other corporations and associations.
Section 4 of the Florida Act provides for the survival of existing corporations, and Section 5 brings all existing corporations under the terms of

the Act. The failure of the Texas Act to include such provisions may lead
to much confusion in'that state. Section 7 of the Florida Act reserves to the
legislature the power to alter, revoke, etc., corporate powers, rights, privileges and/or immunities of a corporation insofar as such are granted to it
by the state. However, such reserved power can only be exercised when required by public policy and not when vested constitutional rights are thereby
impaired. Nor can the state exercise any such reserved power in taking part
in any disputes among groups within the corporation. Since the Texas Act
contains no such limitations, it is possible that the Texas courts may allow
the articles to be amended by the majority shareholders so as to forfeit
accrued cumulative dividends of minority preferred shareholders. That uncertainty should be removed by adequate provisions. The Act at least reads
that way, even though the Texas courts might hold that a delegation of such
arbitrary power would be unconstitutional. 45 At best, uncertainty would
prevail, and, if the provisions are upheld, a vicious circumstance would be
43. Art. 3.
44. Section 3 makes the Act applicable to all types of corporations except insofar
as other statutory provisions specifically exclude special types or classes thereof.
45. The
'Texas Act in Article 53, Section B, provides: "In particular, and without
limitation upon such general power of amendment, a corporation may amend its articles
of incorporation, from time to time, so as:

"(11 ) To cancel or otherwise affect the right of the holders of the shares of any class
to receive dividends which have accrued but have not been declared.
"(12) To divide any preferred or special class of shares, whether issued or unissued,
into series and fix and determine the designations of such series and the variations in the
relative rights and preferences as between the shares of such series."
"One writer stated over twenty years ago that 'few branches of corporation law arc
in a more confused and unsatisfactory state than that relating to the right of minority
stockholders to prevent amendments to the corporate charter, to which they have not
(Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders gnd Amendgiven their assent, from being operative.'
ments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 585 [1927]). Unfortunately, the
Hart, The Right to Accrued Cumulative Preferred
statement is still apropos today."
Dividends, 10 Oino S.L.J. 383. (1949).
The scores of articles, comments and casenotes appearing in the legal periodicals
evidence a grave concern as to the recklessly uncertain state of this phase of corporation
law. One writer in particular has made an elaborate study of the general problems involved. See following articles of Arno C. Becht: Power to Remove Accrued Dividends
by Charter Amendment, 40 COL. L. Rev. 633 (1940); Corporate Charter Amendments:
Issues of Prior Stock and Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50 COL, L. REv. 900 (1950);
Changes in the Interests of Classes of Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amendments
Reducing Capital, and Altering, Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking Fund Provisions,
36 CORNELL L.O. 1 (1950); Alteration of Accrued Dividends, 1, 49 Mien. L. R v. 363
(1951); Alteration of Accned Dividends, 11, 49 Micn. L. Rev. 565 (1951).
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created. As a protection to the investor in cumulative preferred shares and
to retain future ready marketability of such shares, such confiscatory powers
should only be exercisable when specifically so provided in the articles. 4
Florida has authorized corporations to be organized "for any lawful
purpose" since its 1868 Act. Heretofore, Texas has permitted incorporation
only for specified purposes. its proposed Act conforms to the general anylawful-purpose rule found in all other states except Montana.
Both Acts extend to domestic corporations very broad general powers.
The Texas Act includes the power "to make donations for the public welfare
or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes and in time of war to
make donations in aid of war activities," and "in time of war to transact
any lawful business in aid of the United States in the prosecution of the
war." The Florida Act has similar provisions, except that it extends the power
to aid in time of war to "the State or United States, or any subdivision thereof." It also validates such powers as to such previous acts. Moreover, it
empowers the corporation to cooperate in or contribute to "boards of trade,
chambers of commerce, commercial clubs, employee credit unions, company
pension plans, annuity plans, or bonus plans . . . and that its directors or

trustees may appropriate and expend corporate funds for any of such purposes as they deem expedient, and as in their judgment will benefit or
contribute to the corporation or public welfare." The Texas Act does not
deny corporations the power to make donations for political purposes, while
the Florida Act does. The Florida Committee is debating whether it should
specifically extend general corporate powers to reimburse corporate officers
who are free from negligence or misconduct for expenses in defending derivitive suits. Texas has included such a provision.
The two Acts differ widely on the power of a corporation to purchase
its own shares. The Florida Act sets up minimum standards regulating such
46. "If there is any economic reason for having preferred stock in the first place,
there is also, it seems, every reason for keeping it preferred after it is sold, and for preserving it from losses which other classes have bargained to bear. Unless protection, both
legislative and judicial, is given to it, it is greatly feared that preferred stock will become
as much a risk-bearing security as common stock is, and will cease to appeal to those
investors who, for reasons best known to themselves, prefer not to buy common stock."

Becht, Changes in the Interests of Classes of Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amendmentv Reducing Capital, and Altering, Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking Fund Provisions, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 30 (1950).

"One thing is clear. If the present course of decisions is continued, it is a serious
question wlether investors can safely purchase preferred stock at a price above the cornmon stock of the same corporation. In all frankness, such certificates should now bear
on their faces a statement that they are subject to alteration in a great variety of ways,
all to their detriment, and that if business is bad, losses will be visited upon them,
regardless ot the liquidation and other preferences which they have on paper. It seems
not unlikely that corporations will find that the temporary expedients which they have
adopted will make it more difficult to attract that part of the market which prefers
security to speculation. The short term solution contains the germs of a long term
problem in threatening destruction of the value of preferred stock as an investment.
Concerning the fear that present amendment policies will have dangerous effects upon
preferred stock as an investment device, see notes: 26 MiNN. L. Rev. 387, at 394 (1942);
4 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 645, at 657 (1937); 54 YALE L.J. 840, at 852 (1945)." Becht,
Alterations of Accrued Dividends, 1I. 49 Mien. L. REv. 565, 594 (1951).
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purchases, but authorizes further limitations to be fixed in the articles,
while Texas establishes a rigid statutory standard.
Article 5, A (4), of the rexas Act contains a grave ambiguity. Does the
phrase "subject to the other provisions of this Act" include the provisions
in the first part of the article? The Texas Act places no restrictions on
purchases of shares in eliminating fractional shares, compromising debts, or
acquiring dissenting shares, and if not "effecting, subject to the other provisions of this Act," share redemption. Such "other provisions" would include restrictions found in Article 61, which were taken in part from Section
137 of the Oklahoma Act. Article 61 of the Texas Act provides that irrespective of provisions in the articles no shares shall be purchased or redeemed
at a price greater than the redemptive price, or when the corporation is,
or would be made insolvent, or its net assets reduced below the aggregate
of liquidation preferences on voluntary dissolution, or would reduce the
stated capital below one thousand dollars. However, Article 5 further provides that such shares may be purchased from earned surplus, and, upon a
two-thirds vote of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, out of capital
surplus. 47 Or, if an open-end investment company, registered under the
Federal Investment Company Act of 1940, and so provided in the articles,
shares may be purchased from either earned or capital surplus without a vote
of the shareholders.
The Florida provisions on such purchases or redemptions set up extra
safeguards and allow more flexibility. Section 130 does not permit under
any circumstances purchases or redemptions, if the company is, or would be
made, insolvent, or the net assets are less, or would be made less, than the
aggregate of the highest liquidation preferences of outstanding shares plus
one-half of the amount that the stated capital exceeds such liquidation preferences, or when the net assets are, or would be made, less than 125 per cent
of the aggregate of the gross debts and liabilities, other than share liability.
In the absence of such conditions, subject to any further limitations in the
articles, such shares may be purchased or redeemed out of earned surplus,
out of capital surplus or stated capital if such shares: (a) have a liquidation
preference, (b) are purchased to eliminate fractional shares, (c) are dissenting shares and are purchased as required by the provisions of this Act
for purchasing such shares, (d) are purchased in order to collect or conpromise in good faith a debt, claim, or controversial amount, or (e) are purchased upon the conversion of shares pursuant to the articles of incorporation.
Both Acts purport to eliminate the ultra vires doctrine as concerns
47. This tw;o-thirds vote provision is extremely bad.

Should funds or assets set up

to protect creditors and preferred shareholders (who often hold non-voting shares) ever

be subject to dispersal at the whims and caprice of the holders of two-thirds of the voting
shares outstanding?
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parties without the corporation.48 Both specifically abrogate the defense of
lack of corporate capacity; the provisions in both acts are identical as both
were taken from the Oklalmina Act. 'lhe prime difference in the ultra vires
provisions in the acts is that in the Florida Act the general subject is broken
ip and its different phases dealt with separately, while the Texas Act treats
them in a more general way,
The Texas Act offers no solution to the dilemma where the corporation
asserts ultra vires as a defense to an action on a contract entered into by it
through its agent when the other party had actual knowledge that the contract was entirely beyond the powers of the corporation. Since the articles
define and limit the authority of the officers and agents of the corporation,

some authorities contend that this is a question of agency law and a third
party cannot recover from a principal on a contract when lie knew at the
time the contract was entered into that the agent was acting without authority from the principal. On the other hand, if the defense is barred, others
point out that possibly the corporation might be making a practice of

ignoring the scope of its powers and the management may have given the
agent express authority to perform such acts. Therefore, this would reincarnate the ultra vires ghost and license it to again stalk its prey. The Florida
draft, in its revised form, provides that such defense will be allowed only
when the other contracting party is without the corporation and "had actual
knowledge that the corporation throIgh its representatives was then acting
beyond or without the scope of its authorized powers, and who had reasonable cause to believe that the board of directors or shareholders of the
corporation had not and would not authorize or ratify such contract."
Although the provisions aimed at protecting the corporate name are
slightly more comprehensive in the Florida Code, both Acts quite fully safeguard interests therein .4 : Both drafts follow, to a considerable extent, the
provisions in the Illinois Act. Texas permits a name to be reserved for 120
days, while Florida limits the time to 60 days. The Texas Act allows a
foreign corporation to operate in that state under a registered assumed name,
while the Florida Act only permits the domesticated corporation to add
such words to its name as necessary to conform to the name requirements of
the Act. Florida, unlike Texas, has no provisions for the registration in the
state, or annual renewal thereof, of the name of an undomesticated corporation. The Texas Act deals with the procedure used in changing the regist48. Compare Article 6 of the Texas Act with Sections 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 of
the Florida Act. Also see Draftsman's Notes under Sections 1.18, 1.27, 1.28, and 1.29,
18 OKLA. STAr.

ANN.

"The provisions of the proposed Act purport to carefully
hypotheses supporting the outmoded ultra vires doctrine, and,
dead, to place each in its own little sepulchre, and in turn carve
above the portals of each. Already the law reports evidence an

single out each of the
after pronouncing each
the respective obituaries
over-expanded graveyard
of iust claims of corporate creditors which have fallen the victims of a misconceived
juridicial fantasy." Wright, Protection of Creditors Under the Proposed Florida Business
Corporation Act, 6 MIAI,
L.Q. 192, 196 (1952).
-49. Texas Act, Arts. 7-10;FTlorida Act, Sees. 11-13.
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ered office and/or registered agent under its "substantive" provisions.", This
would seem to be procedural. Since the specifications as to the registered
office and registered agent are a part of the articles, the Florida Act logically
treats a.change thereof as a form of an amendment of the articles. Thus,
Section 157 provides that "unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, the board of directors of a domestic corporation may amend
such articles of such corporation only in the following ways:
(1) To change the registered office;
(2) To change or appoint a registered agent; .
The actual procedure in both Acts is quite similar. Under the Texas
provision, the "corporation" effects the change, while Florida specifically
states that the procedure is to be instigated by the board of directors. See
Articles 12, 110 and I Il and Sections 197 and 205 of the respective Acts.
The Florida Act treats the service of process on corporations, domestic
and doncsticated, in one section, " while the Texas draft duplicates its provisions in two different articlcs.2 - That repetition seems to serve no useful
purpose, and contributes additional verbosity.
T he Texas
Act is less specific, less articulate, less comprehensive, less
exacting than the Florida Act as to the records to be maintained in the
registered officeY3 Likewise, the Texas provisions, relating to the privilege
of inspection of the corporate records by the shareholders, are subject to
criticism. These provisions, along with the requirements for keeping records,
were taken from the 1933 Illinois Act. The provisions of the Illinois Act
have nt with severe criticism.' However, a liberal construction placed on
them by the Illinois Supreme Court has removed some of the uncertainty
therefrom. 5 1 Article 46 of the Texas Act only extends to shareholders who
have either been shareholders for six months or hold five per cent of all
outstanding shares. On the other hand, the Florida Act extends the privilege to all shareholders, share trust certificate holders and others entitled
50. Art. 12.
51. Sec. 17.
52. Arts. 13 and 112.
53. Cf. Texas Act, Art. 46, and Florida Act, Sees. 16 and 73.
54. "The penalty fixed by Ill., Smith-IHlrd Ann. St. ch. 32, § 157.45, is as ridiculous
as are the conditions of percentage and time of share ownership precedent to the right
of inspection. Let us observe how this Illinois provision might work out with a large
corporation. 'rake, for instance, a corporation with 10,000,000 shares outstanding valued
at $1,000,000,000. To be allowed to inspect, the shareholder would have to own $50,000,000 worth of shares ($250,000,000 under La. § 38, if a competitor). Ile could
have 499,000 shares worth $49,999,900 and have no right of inspection. Now, if lie
buys one more share, he will have such right. Not only that, bitt he acquires with this
one share the right to receive a penalty of $5,000,000 if he is once refused the right to
inspect one of the records. If refusal of the right warrants such a penalty, such a vahlable right should not be denied to practically all shareholders." Draftsman's Notes, 18
OKLA. SI'lA. ANN. § 1.71, Subsection d.
See also Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, I
U. OF Cii. L. REV. 357, 383 et. seq. (1934); Wright and Baughman, Past and Present
Trends in Corporation Law: Is Florida in Step? 2 MIAMi L.Q. 69, 112 (1947).
55. See Sawers v. American Penolic Corp., 404 111.440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1949), and
other cases annotated under Section 157,45, ILL. S-rA'r. ANN., c 3.
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to represent shares. It further provides that the articles or by-laws may
bestow such privilege upon bondholders and/or other creditors, or any class
or classes thereof, absolutely or subject to any conditions or limitations contained in the by-laws. '
The Florida Committee is of the opinion that restrictions oil bringing
derivative suits in Section 142 of the Act, together with the provisions inl
subsection b of Section 74, that such inspection ,must be for a "proper purpose," and in subsection d providing, "It shall be a defense, among any
others available, to anly action for penalties under this Section, or for damaages, or injunctive relief, that the person suing therefor, within two vears
immediately prior thereto, either has sold, or offered tor sale, any list of
shareholders of such corporation, or any other corporation, or has aided or
abetted any person in procuring any list of shareholders for any such purpose, or has improperly used any information secured through any prior
examination of the books and record of such corporation, or any other
corporation," serve as ample safeguards against unwarranted "fishing expeditions." Moreover, subsection a of Section 74 provides: "A list of the
names and post-office addresses of the principal officers of every corporation
shall be kept open to public inspection for any proper purpose at its registered office during usual business hours."
Furthermore, the penalties in the Texas Act assessed for denying to
the shareholder the privilege to inspect the corporate records are ridiculously inconsistent with the restricted privilege of inspection. This variance has
been discussed elsewhere by this author. '7
Article 14 of the Texas Act, dealing with authorized shares, was taken
from Section 14 of the A.B.A. Act, which in turi was copied from Section
14 of the 1933 Illinois Act, with no major changes except to allow for n]onvoting shares. The provisions stipulate that, when so provided in the articles,
a corporation may create special classes of shares having different dividend,
redemptive, voting (as to cumulative voting only), liquidation rights and
conversion rights. Such conversion rights do not permit conversions to
classes of shares having prior or superior dividend or liquidation preferences.
Article 15, relating to allotment of shares in series, has as its source Sections
15 of the Illinois and A.B.A. Acts. This article is articulate and long. Under
this article, the articles of incorporation may provide for dividing the classes
of shares into series and fixing the relative rights of each series as to dividends, redemptive price and terms, liquidation price, sinking ftnd and conversion terms or the articles may delegate to the board the power to fix
such relative rights, rhel balance of the article deals with procedural matter

56. Sec. 74, c.
57. See note 54 supra.
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relating to preparing and filing of the resolution by tie board fixing such

relative rights. 8
The provisions of the Florida Act as to power and authorization of
classes and series of shares in content do not vary widely from the Texas
provisions. The chief differences are that the Florida Act does not permit
any variation among the series of a class as to cumulative voting or as to a
sinking fund. The Florida Act further specifies that the attributes of outstanding shares may not be altered, that there must be at least one class of
shares with full voting rights, and redeemable shares are to be redeemed
only at the option of the corporation. " It is believed that these three provisions are essential in order to remove any possible uncertainty as to each
matter.
The Florida Act has also authorized a class of shares, referred to as
"labor shares." This is an innovation in the statutory law in this country,
although such shares have been authorized by the statutes of New Zealand
and New South Wales for two decades or more. This new plan, which
has operated very satisfactorily in the two jurisdictions above mentioned,
allows, when so provided in the articles, such shares to be allotted to
employees in consideration for their capitalized special skills or training.
The dividends received thereon are received in lieu of the increased portion
of wages normally paid to specially skilled or trained employees. It is
predicted that this plan, if fully developed and utilized, will go far in solving

many of our present day industrial problems resulting from conflicts between labor and capital.
The Florida Act requires that a subscription for sha'res shall be in writ58. This is another of the many examples in the Texas Act where procedural matter
is commingled with substantive material under Part II of the Act which purports to
contain only substantive provisions.
59. Sees. 79, b(1), 62, c and 80, a, and 80, c.
60. Section 39 authorizes the setting up of employees' share-ownership plans. Such
provisions arc now quite common in state corporation statutes. The use of such plans by
corporations is equally common. However, these provisions do not supply the flexibility
necessary to meet the demands to establishing true employee profit-sharing setups. The
authorization of a new type of shares, known as "labor shares," aims to supply such
flexibility. It must be borne in mind that no corporation is required to allot such shares;
it is purely optional and is only permissible when so stipulated in the articles.
The concept of labor shares is not new in this country, although this is the first
attempt to reduce such authorization to a statutory foromula. However, New Zealand
(New Zealand Companies Act of 1933, § 59 - see also N.Z. Cos. Acts of 1924, § 52
and of 1931, § 23) and New South Wales (New South Wales Companies Act of 1936,
§§ 165-68) have had statutes in effect for many years authorizing such shares. Many
periodicals and books have carried enthusiastic comments on tle need for plans of this
general nature. Cordon, A Philosophy of Profit-Sharing, 18 ADV. McM'r. 73 (1948);
Cox, Fifty Million Stockholders, 12 Anv, Memtr. 148 (1947); MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FRE
MArN's LIFE, p. 359 (1946); STEWART AND COX;PER, PROFIT SHARING AND STOCK OwNERSHiIP FOR WAGE EARNERS AND Exncurivws, pp.

55-79 (1945).

"Frank Gannett, newspaper publisher, told a senate committee Thursday general
establishment of profit-sharing plans deserving the confidence of workers would 'mean
the dawn of a new day for America.'
" 'If most of our corporations would work out such a policy as I have described,'
Gannett said in testimony before the senate profit-sharing committee, 'we would have
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ing and signed by the subscriber.'
The Texas Act has no such provision.
Both Acts make pre-incorporation subscriptions irrevocable for a period of
six months unless the subscription contract provides otherwise, or consent
is given by all of the subscribers."' The Florida Act provides that, unless
the terms of the subscription otherwise provide, pre-incorporation subscriptions lapse at the end of twelve months if 11o certificate of incorporation is
theretofore issued. Both Acts provide for uniformity of calls, and that
payment shall be determined by the board, The Texas Act further stipulates that calls shall be collected the same as other debts. Both Acts provide that the by-laws may provide other penalties, but the portion paid on
such subscriptions shall not be forfeited until a default of twenty days.
The Florida Act combines the procedural remedies in collecting calls
with the collection of assessments. Assessments are authorized under the
Florida Act but not under the Texas Act. More than eleven sections of
comprehensive, articulate provisions of the Florida Code are devoted to the
procedures to be employed in effecting calls and assessments.
Shares may
be assessable only when so provided in the articles, and the certificates evidencing such shares must be on blue paper or parchment and the fact that
shares are assessable must be plainly stated in the share certificate. The
articles may provide that the shares, or any specified class or series, shall be
assessable to such amount and upon such terms, conditions and limitations
as therein provided, or the power and authority to fix the assessability may,
by tle articles, be delegated to either the shareholders or the board. In
delegating such power and authority to the shareholders, if so provided ill
the articles, the shareholders may be granted the further authority to either
exercise such power and authority or redelegate them to the board.
Three cumulative renedies have been authorized in the collection of
delinquent calls and assessments, viz., to proceed as in collecting any other
few strikes, for the worker would understand that to tic tp the production of a factory
would be to lessen his own reward.' " Associated Press Report, (Dec. 1, 1938).
Harold E. Stassen, in his proposed platform, has a plank favoring wide-scale profit
sharing. Profit Sharing and Freedom Saving (Address before the Alcxander Hamilton
Club of Maryland, Baltimore, Feb. 7, 1952).
hllere scorns to be no reason for any opposition to such provisions in a corporation

act. On the other hand, such provisions may open the road to an entirely iewv distribution of ownership and control of our industrial corporations.

I can conceive of nothing

more needed or quite so important as the development of a joint interest which will bring
about a closer cooperation in industry. The various types of sabotage by lockouts and
sitdown strikes are not an ultimate solution; they are only symptoms of a diseased condition. The interests of the entrepeneur, the capitalist, and the laborer are joint and
common. These provisions suggest and make possible a new avenue for a better

approach to the basic problems facing our industrial life. Maybe, the industrial corporations will make use of them. New Zealand and Australia are much further advanced
in dealing with labor problems than we are in this country.
61. Sec. 25, a.
62. Texas Act, Art. 16, A, and Florida Act, Sec. 25, b. The lorida Act (See. 2
[9]) defines a "subscription" as a contract between the corporation and the subscriber,

while the Texas Act (Article 2, A[ 5] ) describes it as an offer in the form of a memorandurn in writing.
63. Subsectionis c and d of Sec. 25, and all
of Sections 26 to 36, inclusive.
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debt, to assert and foreclose a lien on the shares, or to levy on and sell the
shares. If so provided in the by-laws other penalties, even a forfeiture of
the amount already paid on the shares, may be evoked. Also, Section 33
provides for making and enforcing calls and assessments when the corporation has become insolvent. The aim in drafting the provisions of the Act
relating to calls and assessments was to precisely and accurately set out the
procedural steps and at the same time permit the greatest degree of
flexibility.
Both Acts provide that par shares may be allotted for consideration
fixed by the board at not less than the par value, and that the board shall
fix the consideration for non-par shares unless the articles reserve such power
to the shareholders. Thereupon the consideration shall be fixed by an
affirmative majority vote of those entitled to represent the total outstanding
shares entitled to vote thereon. The Texas Act states (Art. 7, 13), "when
the consideration is fixed by the shareholders, it shall be determined by a
votc of the holders of a majority of all shares ..
" This statement is very
ambiguous. It should state "by an affirmative vote. .

. '" Moreover, it de-

fines a shareholder as a holder of record. Suppose the right to vote the
shares resides in another. The phraseology of the Florida Act reads, "an
affirmative vote of the persons entitled to represent a majority of all shares
outstanding and entitled to vote thereon." Before any state should consider
adopting the A. 13. A. Act, it should engage a committee to re-edit it so
that it would say what it purports to ican.
In general, the two Acts deal with the required consideration and payment for shares in about the same manner, although their arrangements
differ, the Florida provisions being much more articulate and comprehensive. The Texas Act provides that treasury shares may be disposed of for
such consideration as may be fixed by the board. The Florida draft has
a like provision except that the considcration be "real or fair." Of course,
the Florida Act contains further provisions relating to the fixing of consideration for its labor shares."'
The Florida Act provides that payment of promotional and undcrwriting expenses will not render the shares not fully paid. Article 20 of the
Texas Act sets out a like provision except that the shares will be fully paid
and non-assessable "only if the consideration still retained by the corporation after such disbursements is at least equal to the stated capital of the
corporation represented by such shares." That would mean that these
expenses must be off-set by the aggregate of the premium received on the
shares if all are par shares. If such premium aggregate were insufficient to

balance such disbursement the shares would be neither fully paid nor nonassessable. If not non-assessable, they would be assessable and the act
makes no provision for assessable shares.
The Texas Act permits only one-fourth of the consideration received
64. Texas Act, Art. 17, C; Florida Act, Sees. 82, f, and 132, b.
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for non-par shares to be allocated to capital surplus while the Florida Act
allows one-third to be thus allocated." '
The Texas Act refers to share certificates as representing the shares.
The certificates don't represent; they evidence the shares. "To represent
shares" is defined in the Florida Act as meaning "to vote, to give written
consent to corporate action, to dissent thereto, and/or execute waivers of
notices of shareholders' meetings." Similar definitions are found in the
California and Oklahoma Acts.
The Texas Constitution, as construed by the courts of that state, prohibits the issuing of share certificates until the shares are fully paid, although
shares may be issued (allotted) when not fully paid.0" The Texas Act
requires that shares be fully paid before either the shares or the share
certificate is issued. It is not clear just what interest the subscriber has in
the corporation, if any.
Considerable study is required to discover just what the step-by-step
net results are when subscribing for and allotting the shares and issuing the
share certificate under the Texas Act. Most certainly the stated legal
formulas are out of conformity with the practical procedural concepts in
the business world. Let us observe from a practical standpoint how the
procedure is carried on in an every-day business way. The promotional
functions arc a series of acts essential or incidental to the initiation and
launching of the new enterprise. The promoter first searches out a project
or enterprise that appears to lend itself to corporate exploration and utilization. lie must next interest investors therein and bring them together for
the purpose of financing the proposed business unit. He then generally
carries through the planning of its set-up and directs the launching of the
new undertaking. I-Tow does the promoter go about this? The early stages
of the process are factual in nature; legal formulas are often not injected
65. Texas Act, Art. 19, B; Florida Act, § 85 b,
66. Article 12, § 6, of the Texas Constitution provides: "No corporation shall issue
stock or bonds except for money paid, labor done or property actually received, and all
fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void." Subscriptions of shares may
be had, shares may be allotted as partly-paid or as installment stock, and the allottee may
be treated as a shareholder, without violating this constitutional provision, as long as the
share certificate is not issued. Smoot v. Perkins, 195 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
As late as 1949, Mr. Beisheini expressed the view that there was some doubt as to
whether or not a subscriber for shares of a Texas corporation could exercise the rights
of a slsarcholder before be has paid in full for the subscribed shares. The Need for
Revising the Texas Corporation Statutes, 27 TEx. L. REv. 659, 667-68. But see TEx.
REv. Civ. S'rxAr. ANN. (Vernon

1925), Arts, 1308, 1336, and 1345.

Since the Texas

courts have evidenced much coufusion in interpreting this simple constitutional limitation, it is hard to imagine what will result if they are forced to construe the many ambiguous provisions found in the proposed Texas Act. The purpose of the constitutional
provision is to prevent the allotting of fictitious or "watered" stock. Certainly the provisions of the Florida Act could not logically be construed to be violative of such limitations. No corporation code more fully guards against the issuing of "watered" shares.
Under the new Texas Act much uncertainty will prevail as to the status of the holder
of shares which are not fully paid. Such uncertainty will keep many incorporators from
iucorporating in Texas. The Texas Committee could well afford to redraft portions of its
proposed Act following the general plan advanced in the Florida draft, especially as to
subscriptions, allotment, and payment of shares.
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into the configuration until he proceeds in shaping the corporate lay-out.
He charts the contour by plotting a prospectus-which may only exist in the
form of a conceptual asterism. With this as a procedural recipe, he draws
tip a subscription agreement, usually in the name of the proposed corporation by him as promoter, stating that each signer agrees to subscribe for
the number of shares listed opposite his signature. Beneath this statement
is a lineated space set off by vertical lines into columns. At the top of the
first column is the word "Date," and the other columns are labelled "No. of
Shares," "Class of Shares," and "Signature." The typed form may contain
various stipulations which make up a part of the subscription contract; the
pattern usually varies in each instance.
The promoter, or promoters, then proceeds to procure subscribers' signatures on the respective lines opposite the listing of the shares they have
committed themselves to take. His name may or may not be included in
the subscription list, and this procedure may be carried on before or after
incorporation. However, it is usually initiated before the articles are filed.
At least, commitments are generally set out in some form of a prospectus,
subscription list, promoters' agreement, or what-not prior to incorporation.
Suppose subscribers have signed the subscription list prior to incorporation
and the statute provides, as both acts under consideration here do, that a
subscription is irrevocable except upon consent of the other subscribers, for
six months. What would the ordinary businessman consider the legal status

of the parties to be at this stage? Hie would doubtless assume that the
subscription agreement constituted a contract between the subscriber and
the promoter and also among the subscribers. lie also would doubtless
regard the legal relations subject to other special terms set out in the contract among the parties about as follows:
1. As to the subscribera) If he were incompetent to enter into contracts, the agreement
would be revocable by him; otherwise,
b) He could not revoke the contract during a reasonable period from
the date set opposite his signature without the consent of the
other subscribers;
c) That when the corporation came into being a novation would
be effected by the corporation being substituted for the promoter
and the subscriber would ipso facto become a shareholder and
from then on would owe certain new duties to the corporation;
d) That he would be required to pay in full for his shares as calls
were made by the board of directors; and
e) That he could enforce the contract against the other parties thereto, and it could be enforced by them against him.

2. As to the promoter-.
a) That he would owe a fiduciary duty, similar to that owed by an
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b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

3. As
a)

agent to his principal, and that hc must diligently pursue the
task of bringing the corporation into existence;
That, in the event the corporation is not brought into bcing, he
should be holding any funds collected from subscribers in trust
for them, and, if the corporation is formed he should then hold
such funds as trustee for the benefit of the corporation;
That he had implied authority to make expenditures and enter
into contracts necessary in carrying out his promotional functions
and that the birth of the corporation effected a novation whereby all of his legitimate, necessary promotional acts were automatically ratified by the corporation and all rights and liabilities
resulting from such prior promotional acts, and future rights
and duties, would be reposed in the corporation;
That all pre-incorporation contracts entered into by him on behalf
of the corporation which were not reasonably necessary or expediicnt in successfully advancing the promotional steps in launching
the corporate enterprise, but were entered into in good faith in
gaining advantages or benefits in behalf of the corporation,
would not ipso facto becoue corporate contracts, but that they
would only become binding on it and effect a release of him
when accepted as a novation by the corporation-possibly at the
shareholders' organization meeting-and that a voluntary acceptance of the benefits could imply acceptance of the contract by
the corporation, and that whether the promoter would continue
to be personally bound by the contract, if the corporation refused
to accept it, would depend upon the terms of the contract;
That all other pre-incorporation contracts, which were not urgent
or would "keep" until the corporation became organized and in
a position to speak for itself, entcrcd into by him on behalf of
the corporation, would in no way be binding on it unless and
until the corporation entered into a new contract directly with
the other contracting party (or by some form of a novation of
the former contract), that whether he would be liable oi a warranty that the corporation would substitute its contract for his,
or whether lie would continue to be bound by the contract,
would depend upon its terms; and
That he would be able to enforce the contract against the subscribers tip until the corporation replaces him in the contract
relationships.
to the CorporationThat until the corporation comes into being, it cannot be the
object of any legal relations, and it cannot serve as a principal
in an agency relationship, nor can, it be a party to a contract,
therefore it could have no pre-incorporation liabilities or duties;
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b) That pre-incorporation subscription contracts must exist between
the promoter and the subscribers, and that such contracts generally contain an implied provision that a novation will be effected
when the corporation comes into existence whereby the corporation replaces the promoter and from then on the contract becomes effective between the corporation and the subscriber, but
the contract is ipso facto shifted from a subscription contract to
a share contract between it and the person, who up to then, had
retained the role of a prospective subscriber;
c) That an ipso facto novation is also effected, by the corporation
replacing the promoter as a party to all contracts reasonably
necessary or expedient in promoting the corporation, as the corporation comes into being. The corporation has no option as
to such novation, its creation operating as an automatic novation;
d) That, as to contracts entered into on behalf of the corporation by
the promoter, if the contract was aimed at gaining advantages in
favor of the corporation in urgent matters which would not
"keep" until the corporation had assumed a sui juris status, an
option in favor of the corporation would by implication be made
a part of the terms of such contract, giving the corporation the
power to effect a novation of the contract by its own affirmative
action; and
e) That other pre-incorporation contracts entered into by the promoter, although they may be created by the promoter on behalf
of the corporation, place no obligations on the corporation, as to
such purely corporate matters, unrelated to the promotional
functions.
The Florida Act purports to supply the legal formulas necessary to implement these concepts. Section 9 represents the first statutory attempt to

establish such legal formulas establishing the rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities of the promoter, the subscriber, the corporation, and third
parties concerning pre-incorporation matters. All the provisions in the Florida Act conform to these conceptional suppositions.
Now, we shall attempt to analyze the corresponding results attained
under the Texas Act. First, that Act defines a subscription as an offer to
receive and pay for shares.'7 When the pre-incorporation subscriber signs
67. "If the offerer stipulates that his offer shall remain open for a specified time, the
first question is whether such stipulation constitutes a binding contract. . . . When such
a stipulation is binding, the further question arises, whether it makes the offer irrevocable.
It has been a common opinion that it does, but that is clearly a mistake. . . .An offer
is merely one of the elements of a contract; and it is indispensable to-the making of a
contract that the wills of the contracting parties do, in legal contemplation, concur at
the moment of making it. An offer, therefore, which the party making it has no power

to revoke, is a legal impossibility. Moreover, if the stipulation should make the offer
irrevocable, it would be a contract incapable of being broken; which is also a legal impossibility. The only effect, therefore, of such a stipulation is to give the offeree a claim
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the subscription list circulated by the promoter, isn't there some sort of a
contract with the promoter? Since they cannot withdraw the offer within
six months without the consent of the other subscribers, isn't there a contract among the subscribers? To whom does the "offer" run? The corporation cannot be an offeree as it is non-existant 15 A subscriber is defined as
an offeror in a subscription which has been accepted by the corporation.,

There is brought into existence a subscription when the offer is made. So,
in the case of a pre-incorporation subscription, we have an offer without an
offeree and a subscription without a subscriber. Can anyone subscribe for

shares and not be a subscriber? Webster's Dictionary defines a subscriber
as one who subscribes. Suppose the pre-incorporation subscriber revokes his
subscription a week after signing the subscription list without obtaining
the consent of the other subscribers. To whom is he liable? IHc can't be
liable to a non-existant entity, the corporation. It is not a contract-only
an offer-so neither the promoter nor the other subscribers would have a
cause of action. Suppose S were the first to sign the subscription list and
that he signed up on January 2 for fifty per cent of the authorizcd shares,
and, that others, relying on his subscription, had signed up for the other
fifty per cent on or before June 20, at which time S notified the promoter
and the other subscribers that he revoked his subscription. Would a court
of equity enjoin him from withdrawing? If so, who would bring the action?
And in bringing a suit in equity, could equity decree specific performance of
a contract when there was no contract? Assuming that S is financially competent, would there not be an adequate remedy at law, if there were any
remedy at all? Is there any degree of uniqueness about the contract or its
subject matter (assuming there had been a contract) which could possibly
give equity a toe-hold? Moreover, does a person not have the power to
breach an ordinary contract that has no uniqueness about it? It might be
suggested that the matter could be solved by going ahead and filing the
articles before July 2 and proceed to treat S as a subscriber.
But, suppose the other subscribers, after receiving notice that S was
withdrawing, by unanimous consent all revoked their subscriptions. What
then? Or we might further assume that the subscription provided that the
articles were not to be filed until all of the shares were subscribed, or suppose that the promoter was discouraged and did not proceed to file thc
for damages if the stipulation be broken by revoking the offer."

LANCDELL, SuAxyR,

OF

CoNTRACTS § 178 (2d Ed. 1880).

68. In making an offer, legal relations are created, and the existence of legal relations
require at least two legal persons. The offer creates in the offeree certain legal powers,
viz., to reject it, make a counter-offer, or accept it. He also is vested with a legal
liability in that the offerer may withdraw it before acceptance. On the other hand, the

offerer is vested with corresponding jural correlatives: he is subjected to the legal liabilities that the offeree may reject the offer, make a counter-offer, or accept the offer, and

the offerer also is vested with the legal power to withdraw the offer before it is acted
upon by the offeree. From this it is clear that it is nonsense to speak of the existence
of an offer when there is no offerce.
69. Art. 2, A (6).
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articles. What would be the legal consequences under these various suppositions?

What would be the results under the Florida Act? Of course, the subscriber could breach his subscription contract and withdraw.

However, he

would be liable to the promoter and the other subscribers for the damage
they had suffered. The uncertainty of measure of damages would hardly
warrant equitable relief through specific performance of the contract. Until

the corporation comes into existence the only contracts are those between
the promoter and the respective subscribers and among the subscribers. The
parties certainly assume that binding obligations are originated by the signing of this subscription list; they were not purporting to be merely practicing
penmanship.
Would tile promoter be privileged to abandon tle undertaking entirely? It would be implied that he must go forward in good faith, using
a reasonable degree of skill and care in completing the organization of
the company. Of course, the facts in each case would be the determining
factors, and the terms, if any, of the contract, fixing the duties, etc., of the
promoter normally would be conclusive. If there be no specific provisions
thereon in the subscription contract, or other facts establishing a contrary
intent, it should be implied that the promoter would not be liable if for
some unforseeable reason he could not carry out his endeavor. It would
be implied from the fact that the subscriptions are made irrevocable for
six months that the legislature intended that six months would be a reasonable time for completing the pre-incorporation functions. It would further
be implied that he would not be allowed to escape liability if he acted
in bad faith, and without cause abandoned the attempt or pursued it in
a negligent or insincere manner.
One of the implied terms of the contract would be that it was mutually agreed that the parties (the promoter and subscribers) consented as
between and among themselves that the creation of the corporation would
effect a novation whereby it superseded the promoter as to the promotional
contract, and that the status of the subscribers would be transmuted to
that of shareholders. The ipso facto acceptance of the novation and the
subscriptions by the corporation is effected by operation of the statute.
The provisions of Section 9 of the Florida Act establishes a composite
legal formula to be, in the absence of a different expressed intent of the
parties, reposed upon a factual norm congruent with the customary understanding of the parties concerned in the pre-incorporation process as hereto70
fore set out.
Article 16 of the Texas Act states that a filing of the articles by the
70. These observations further illustrate the need for statutory formulas fixing the
relative rights of the promoter, the corporation, the pre-incorporation subscribers, and
other parties dealing with a promoter acting on behalf of the corpoation. See Inadequacy
of Traditional Concepts in the Treatment of the Promoter, 81 U. OF PA. L. R~v. 746,
75354 (1933).
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Secretary of State constitutes an acceptence by the corporation of the subscriptions contained on the subscription list filed with the articles. The
subscription under that act is an anomaly in that it is an offer without
an offeree. Here we also have another, the acceptance by a non-existent
corporation. Article 50 provides, "Upon the issuance of the certificate of
incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin." Then, Article 49 states
that the Secretary of State shall "(2) File one of such duplicate originals
(of the articles) in his office." "(3) Issue a certificate of incorporation. ... ."
From this, since there is no statement in the provision saying that both acts
are to be simultaneous or that they are deemed to be one continuous act,
it is reasonable to assume that the aiticles are filed before the certificate
of incorporation is issued. Certainly the certificate would not be issued
prior to the filing of the articles which would be imperative if there is
to be any corporation in existence which could accept the subscriptions
when the articles are filed. Moreover, there is no statutory duty stipulated
in the Act requiring the Secretary of State to issue the certificate of incorporation at any immediate time after the filing of the articles. In other
words, we have a contract-an offer and an acceptance-with only one contracting party.
Article 2, Section A, Paragraph (7), of the Texas Act defines shareholders as one who is a holder of record of shares in [of] a corporation,
while Article 18 provides that when full consideration for shares has been
paid "the shares shall be deemed to have been issued and the subscriber
or shareholder entitled to receive such issue shall be a shareholder with
respect to such shares."
These two provisions are in conflict. If a subscriber were to pay the
balance on his subscription to an authorized agent of the corporation, it
would be a payment "to the corporation." At that instant he would become
a shareholder but considerable time might elapse before his name is posted
on the share ledger. In other words, lie would be a shareholder who was
not a "holder of record." Moreover, as used in the provision in Article
18, a subscriber and a shareholderare one and the same. The terms are used
in apposition and the context indicates that a subscriber, as the word is
there used, would by necessity have to be a shareholder, as otherwise he
would not be "entitled to receive such issue." Again, in Article 23 a joint
meaning is applied to these two terms. However, there the situation is
reversed. A holder of shares certainly is a shareholder, and as the terms
are used he would at the same time be a subscriber. But this subscriberholder-of-shares concept employed in Article 23 differs from the subscribershareholderconcept used in Article 18. Strictly speaking, the concept could
not be confined to that of a shareholder in Article 18. Section A of Article
23 reads:
A holder of, or subscriber to, shares of a corporation shall be
under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect
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to such shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation
the full amount of the consideration, fixed as provided by law, for
which such shares were issued or to be issued.
If he is a holder of shares, he would be a shareholder,and if a shareholder,
under the provisions in Article 18, Section A, he only becomes a shareholder
when the consideration for the shares are fully paid, and then he would not
be liable for any unpaid balance on his shares. Furthermore, if he is a
shareholder, the shares must be fully paid, under Article 18, and then the
shares shall be deemed to be issued and, therefore, there could be no "to
be issued" about such shares.
It might be asked how the Texas Committee could have "loused up"
these provisions in Articles 18 and 23 as they have. *To this author, the
answer is clear. It has resulted from a chain of errors dating back well over
two decades. The Illinois Committee doubtless was working on this early
part of its draft some time at least twenty years ago. That Committee
depended largely upon the Delaware statutes for its source material. Since
its draft, unlike the Delaware laws, did not purport to authorize the issuance of partly paid shares, it did not follow the Delaware statutes in drafting
the first part of Section 18. However, in preparing the first part of Section
23, the Committee certainly drew heavily on the statutes of some jurisdiction
which permitted the issuance of shares which were not fully paid. The
phraseology has only a slight similarity to the Delaware provisions, so the
wording may have had another source. Be that as it may, this provision in
Section 23 of the Illinois Act certainly was formulated originally as a part
of the statutes in a jurisdiction authorizing partly paid shares. Its content
would then be appropriate.
These Illinois provisions were poorly drafted, measured in terms of
standards of twenty years ago, not to mention the present. The A. B. A.
Committee, the substantial part of the personnel of which had been noved
up from its position on the Illinois Committee that had drafted the Illinois
Act, carried these provisions of Sections 18 and 23 without change over into
Sections 17 and 22 of its "Model" Act of 1946. The Comnittee again lifted
these provisions over into Sections 18 and 23 of its 1950 "Model" Act. The
Texas Committee in turn has taken the 1950 A. B. A. diaskeuasis of the
Illinois Act and adopted it after revising it in spots. Thns, these provisions, without any substantive change, passed from Sections 18 and 23 of
the Illinois draft finally to Articles 18 and 23 of the Texas Act.
In summarizing, we must say that these provisions were poorly formulated when drafted in the late twenties, and they would be primeval now if
they had been skillfully formulated then. Any business corporation act
denying the allotment of partly paid shares is, indeed, archaic in that regard.
Then we find that the Texas Committee added the final degree of
confusion by assigning new meanings to key terms used in the provisions.
The Texas definition of shareholderwas taken directly from the 1933 Illinois
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Act, while a fallacious definition of subscriber was formulated. This new
definitional concept is so foreign to logic, usage, and legal concepts in general that every provision in the Act in which the term subscriber appears, if
they are to make sense, would have to be redrafted. Such a task would
require the skill of a capable, experienced legal draftsman. The injection of
such a delusive concept into the statutory corporation law of any state
would lead to unlimited confusion.
The Texas Act is vague on the matter of control of the corporation
during its formative stages. Article 33 provides that "the business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors." However,
it can be implied from the provisions of Article 52 that the board of directors
does not control the corporation before the organization of the board.
Article 52 provides, "After the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, an
organization meeting of the board of directors named in the articles of incorporation shall be held ...at the call of a majority of the incorporators."
Nothing is said about any shareholders' organization meeting. Thus, the
incorporators, selected by the promoters, control until the board of directors
is organized under the provisions in Article 52. Thereafter, the board
named in the articles controls until a special, or the first annual, meeting of
the shareholders is held and a new board is selected. Under Article 52, the
board adopts the by-laws. And Article 26 provides that the time, place, etc..
of the shareholders' meetings shall be "as may be provided in the by-laws."
Therefore, the board has absolute control over the shareholders' meetings.
Article 26, Section C, provides that special meetings of the shareholders
may be called by the president (appointed by the board), the board of
directors, or the holders of not less than one-tenth of all the shares entitled
to vote at such meetings, or such other officers or persons as may be provided
in the articles or by-laws. This would give the promoters a possible permanent dictatorial control of the corporation. Directors need not be shareholders unless so provided in the articles or by-laws, and the promoters control the content of both. The promoters can select themselves as incorporators and in the articles name themselves as directors. Under Article 34 the
number of directors, other than the first board named in the articles, is fixed
or may be reduced by the board-controlled by-laws. The board in like manner can control the fixing of dates of shareholders' meetings. There is
nothing in the Act to require the board to ever provide in the by-laws for
any shareholders' meetings, special or annual. The directors hold office
until their successors are elected and qualified.
There can be no shareholders until their shares are fully paid, and subscription payments are subject to call by the board. There is nothing in the
Act compelling the board to call, or even receive, full payment for the
shares. Thus, the board could make a call for an eighty or ninety per cent
payment and enforce such call "in the same manner as any debt due the
corporation." Under these provisions as found in the Texas Act, a corpora-
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tion is born without shareholders and the promoters who conceived it can
fully manipulate a perpetual control over it. They can, by their control
over the contents of the articles and by-laws, fix their own salaries and the
salaries of the other officers. The board would naturally select the controlling officers from its membership, and then by its control over the subscription calls could perpetuate a corporation without any shareholders ad infinitun. All the board would need to do would be to see that no subscriber
was allowed to pay in full for his shares. Tihis would allow "racketeers" to
move in and perpetuate the greatest "legal swindles" of all time. By use of
the holding company as a device, the potentialities under such a statutory
set-tip are startling.
The Texas Act requires no shareholders' Qrganization meeting. It gives
unreasonably broad powers to the board of directors without any safeguards
against arbitrary abuse of such powers. The board is given power over the
adoption of by-laws and shaping of their contents. In fact, the board of
directors is given a carte blanche. This is incongruous with the modern
demand for more protection of shareholders against managerial abuses. The
trend in present-day statutory corporation law is to vest more power in the
shareholders, and classes thereof, which they may exercise in protecting their
interests.
The Florida Act places drastic regulatory restraints upon the promoters.
And in concluding, subsection i of Section 9 provides:
Promoters shall keep a complete, accurate record of all preincorporation subscriptions, contracts, accounts, expenditures and
other transactions relating to their promotional activities. Such
record, together with all documents, 'instruments, contracts or other
writing evidencing all such transactions, shall become the property
of the corporation, and shall be presented to the corporation at the
shareholders' organization meeting and shall be filed as a part of
the permanent records of such corporation.
Under the Florida provisions the promoters have control over the preliminary procedures up to the filing of the articles. Thereupon the authority of the direction of the affairs of the corporate fledgling shifts to the
incorporators and resides in them until the election and qualification of the
board of directors. They have full power and authority during this formative period, over the perfecting of the organization of the corporation, such
as further procuring subscriptions and receiving payment of consideration
thereon, and calling and conducting the shareholders' organization meeting.
The initial board of directors is not named in the articles. The more deinocratic method of requiring that the directors be chosen by the shareholders
is employed. Three or more incorporators are required and the only qualification is that they must be legally competent to enter into contracts under
the laws of this state. The promoters and incorporators are burdened with
the duties of fiduciaries. Other qualifications for directors may be fixed in
the by-laws.
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Up to this point less than one-fifth of the proposed Acts of Florida and
Texas has been analyzed and contrasted. To continue on through in a like
manner would protract this concatenation into a volume-length dissertation.
A careful examination of the balance of the Texas draft reveals that its
source, quality, and comprehensiveness do not appreciably vary from the
portion covered. Except for a very limited number of modern concepts
borrowed largely from the statutory laws of Delaware, Ohio, and Oklahoma,
it is substantially a replica of the semi-antiquated 1933 Illinois Act. The
duo-reburnishnent of that Act at the hands of the Committee of the American Bar Association still leaves it too deficient in. modern legal formulas and
too circumscript in ken, for it to be attitudinized as a prototype for
fashioning a business corporation code suited for governing and directing a
progressive tomorrow.
The balance of this discourse will be confined to a compendious treatment of a few of the other more salient innovative features of the Florida
draft which have been either slighted or entirely disregarded by the Texas
Committee in formulating its proposed Act.
Unless its period of duration is limited in the articles, every corporation
formed tinder the Act has perpetual existence, and its existence begins when
the certificate of incorporation is issued by the Secretary of State. Except
as against the State, the certificate of incorporation is conclusive evidence
that a de jure corporation existsj' This abrogates the de facto corporation.
Unless otherwise provided in the articles, shareholders of outstanding
shares have preemptive rights, except as to shares allotted: (1) for consideration other than cash, (2) as a share dividend, (3) to satisfy conversion
rights, (4) under an employees' ownership plan, (5) as labor shares, (6) as
shares of a class after they have been released from preemptive rights by an
affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the shares of that class, or
(7) as shares which the particular holder has by waiver released his rights
thereto or has refused to receive such shares when offered to him on terms
as advantageous as offered to others. Existing shareholders may have preemptive rights as to shares allotted as described in these seven listings, or
shares held as treasury shares, only if so provided in the articles, and then
72
subject to conditions or limitations set out in the articles, if any.
Subject to limitations or restrictions in the articles, conversion rights
and options may be granted, but only in connection with the allotment of
other shares or the issue of other securities. Sufficient authorized shares
to satisfy all outstanding conversion rights and options must be reserved by
73
the corporation.
Corporations are allowed broad, flexible powers in setting up employees' share-ownership plans 7 4 Notice of any meeting may be waived,
71.
72.
73.
74.

Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

14.
37.
38.
39.
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either before or after the meeting, by any director," or any shareholder 76
entitled to represent shares at such meeting. At least a third of the shares
entitled to be voted at a shareholders' meeting must be represented to constitute a quorumn, but, in the absence of provisions in the articles requiring
othenvisc, holders of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to be
represented at the meeting is required for a quorum.7 7 The articles may
provide for higher voting requirements than the minimum specified in the
Act.78 Transfers of shares on the corporate books may be "closed" for a
period not exceeding forty days before any shareholders' meeting. 1'
The Act comprehensively provides for voting of shares by proxy.80
Proxies must be in writing and may be for any period not over seven years.
If no time limit is fixed in the proxy, it expires in eleven months. Provisions, equally as comprehensive and articulate, are formulated as a guide in
voting of shares jointly held,8 ' fractional shares,812 and shares held by fiduciaries,8 : pledgees 8 4 and by corporations.85 Voting trusts and voting pools
are fully provided for.86 "Closed" voting trusts and voting pools are not
permitted."7 Also, the articles may authorize creditors, subject to such conditions, qualifications, and limitations expressed therein, to vote the same as
At least one class of shares must possess
or in lieu of the shareholders'
unrestricted voting privileges,89 and, unless otherwise provided in the articles,
all shares may be voted cumulatively' 9 .
After the election of the board at the shareholders' organization meeting, the business and affairs of the corporation must be controlled by the
board of directors, consisting of at least three persons legally competent to
enter into contracts. Other qualifications, as also the powers and duties, of
directors are fixed by the by-laws insofar as not established by the articles?
If the board consists of nine or more directors, the members may be divided
into two or three classes and only one-half or one-third of the members, as
the case may be, elected each year."2 Salaries of directors as such must be
fixed by an affirmative vote of a majority of all outstanding shares."' It is
possible that the board may fill any vacancy in its membership, and also as
75, Sec. 67, b(3).
76. Sec. 42.

77. Sec. 43.
78. Sec. 49.
79. Subject to any provisions in the articles or by-laws, See. 50, b.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Sec. 52.
Sec. 53.
Sec. 54.
Sec. 55.
Sec. 56.
Sec. 57.
Sees. 58-60.
See. 58, f.

88. Sec. 61.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Sec.
Sec.
See.
See.

62, c.
62, d.
64.
65, c.
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low as one-third of the entire board may constitute a quorum if not less
than two. 4 If the articles or by-laws so authorize, the board may, by a
majority vote of the entire board, appoint an executive committee and delegate broad powers thereto. On the other band, if the articles and/or by-laws
neither forbid nor authorize the creation of an executive committee, such
committee may be established by unanimous vote of the entire board."
A share certificate must be issued to every bona fide shareholder, but
such certificate may be withheld until the shares are fully paid if so provided in the by-laws. If the shares are fully paid, non-assessable, not in a
voting trust or pool, not pledged, or not otherwise encumbered or subject to
a lien or other impairment of the full right, title, and interest therein, the
certificate shall be on white paper or parchment. Certificates evidencing
only partly paid or shares otherwise encumbered must be issued on blue
paper or parchment, and must contain a notation setting out the nature
and terms of the impairment.'0
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, with some amendments, has been
incorporated into the Act."7 The principal amendment thereto concerns
the attachment of shares. In addition to the procedure stipulated in the
U.S.T.A., when the share certificate cannot be seized or is not surrendered
tip, an attachment may be effected through the corporation.
A one-year
statute of limitation between the date of levy and the sale gives due protec-

tion to the vigilant, bona fide holders of the original certificates.0 8
The provisions of the Act are meticulously formulated in regard to the
protection of creditors and preferred shareholders against unwarranted dispersal of the corporate assets by way of dividend payments, redemption of
shares, reduction of capital, ctc. 1 1 However, when it is fully solvent a high
degree of flexibility is afforded the corporation.
rhe provisions of the Act evidence a pronounced advancement in checking the filing of unwarranted derivative suits.100 The procedural steps are
93. Sec. 65, d. It is also possible to have directors' salaries fixed in the articles, or
in the by-laws adopted by the shareholders.
94I. Sec. 67.
95. Sec. 66.
96. Sees. 90-91.
97. See note 37 supra. The U.S.T.A., with some amendments, was adopted by the
Florida Legislature in 1943, and became Chapter 614, 18 FtA. S'irr.
98. Sees. 104-110.
99. Sees. 125-134.
100. Sec. 142.
With honest corporate management there would e no need for derivative actions.
It is equally true that without "shyster" lawyers to file "strike suits" there would be no
cause for alarm about shareholders' bills. But we are not free from either dishonest corporate officers or shyster attorneys. Without derivative suits the former thrives, and with
such suits the latter flourishes. This dilemma has generated a "tension spot" in the field
of corporation law. Legal formulas are lacking to check the "strike-suit" epidemic.
The derivative-suit "drug" compounded to curb the ravages of the mismanagement
malady has been converted into a venal of quackery.
The requirement that the instigator of the suit be the holder of the shares at the
time of the alleged corporate mismanagement, as is provided in See. 23 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, helped some but did not serve to adequately check the
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fully set forth to avoid any confusion as to what must be alleged, etc. Any
holder of share and/or trust certificates evidencing a value of $25,000 or five
per cent of the shares of the corporation who either held such certificate, or
certificates, at the time the alleged wrong was committed, or his title thereto evolved upon him by operation of law, may bring such action without
posting security for costs and possible damage to the corporation, including
attorney's fees. Otherwise, if upon hearing the court finds that there is
probable cause that the suit may be groundless, it can require the plaintiff
to put up such security.
The provisions relating to amendments of the articles are very articulate and comprehensive. The greatest possible flexibility is allowed insofar
as consonant with ample protection of creditors and minority groups within
the corporation. The incorporators may amend the articles, any time before
the corporation has begun business or allotted any shares, upon approval
of the subscribers of two-thirds of the then subscribed shares, if any."' If
the amendment effects any material change in the corporation, non-assenting
ruthless traffic in this form of "shake-down" litigation. Nor did the provisions in See. 23
(e) of the Federal Rules requiring the approval of the court before a compromise and
dismissal of the action, fully halt the abuse. In view of this, a legislative movement
requiring the instigator of the action to post security for costs, defense attorney's fees,
and other possible damage constituted a body thrust at the counter-malady. In fact the
harshness of the requirements in the statutes of Maryland, New Jersey, and New York
practically eliminated the derivative suit, and as a result it is feared that dishonest corporate nanagement may proceed to run rampant. Wolfson, Striking Out "Strike Suits,"
49 FoRTuN'E 137 (March, 1949); Hornstcin, Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits,
43 CoL. L. REV. 301 (1943); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits,
47 COL. L. REV. 1 (1947); Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits
in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944); Zlinkoff, The American Investor and the
Constitutionality of Section 61-B of the New York General Corporation Law, 54 YALE
L.J. 352 (1945); Remington and Kuehnl, Stockholders' Derivative Suits-Section 180.13(3)
[WVis. Stat. 1945], 1948 Vis. L. REV. 580; Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New Jersey
-Effect of Chapter 131, P. L. 1945, 1 RUTGERs L. Rvv. 117 (1947). On the other
hand, it has been suggested that such legislation is a step in the right direction. Carson,
Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 431 (1944).
The problem boils itself down to the matter of devising a legal formula which can
be employed in effectively sifting out the bona fide suits from the spurious actions. The
many substitutes that have been offered seem to add to the belief that the problem has
not yet been solved. Berlock, Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 Mici. L.
Rxv. 597 (1937); Stocker, The Derivative Suit: Its Limitations and a Suggestion, 29
CEO. L.. 363 (1940); Bowes, Should New York's "Security for Expenses" Act Be
Amended?, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 37 (1950); Mullooly and Fuhrman, A Proposed Reform
in the Law Affecting Shareholders' Derivative Actions, 24 Sr. Jounr's L. REv. 326 (1950);
Derivative Action-CorporationEntitled to Proceeds of Private Settlement, 23 NY.U.L.Q.
REV. 192 (1948); Proposed Statutory Revision: Suggested Repeal of Section 61b New
York General Corporation Law Requiring Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suit, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 395 (1949); Shareholders' Derivative Actions-Allowance
of Counsel Fees to the Extent that Benefit Vas Conferred on Corporation, 35 VA. L.
REv. 790 (1949); Stockholders' Derivative Suits: A Federal Question?, 27 IND. L.J. 231
(1952).
The Florida Act simplifies the procedure, requires a holding of either 5% of the
company's shares or securities of the corporation valued at $25,000, places less hurden on
the plaintiff by requiring the defendants at a summary hearing to establish a probability
that the action is groundless or not to the best interests of the corporation, and places
less restrictions on the plaintiff's right to inspect the corporate records in order to search
out others to join as party plaintiffs.

101. Sec. 147.
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subscribers are released from their subscriptions. Moreover, the board of
directors may, at any time, amend tile articles in changing the registered
office or agent, or in fixing or altering the attributes of and alloting new
series of shares when provisions for such are set out in the articles.'
Other amendments of the articles are effected by a resolution by the board
and approved by the shareholders.103 Such approval requires a two-thirds
vote of all sharehlolders entitled to vote thereon and a majority vote of any
class or classes entitled to vote thereon as a class.
Shares may be voted as a class when so provided in the Act or in the
articles, or when the shares are affected adversely.' 4 Shares thus adversely
affected have the right to vote upon such amendment irrespective of any
limitations placed upon its voting. Owing to the fact that the phrase
"affected adversely" is employed in a literal sense, it seems unnecessary to
repeat the long list of instances in Section 149 when shares are thus affected.
Even though an amendment is duly voted, unless the articles otherwise
provide, the minority shareholder still has another method of escape; he may
dissent and require that his shares be purchased before the amendment is
consummated. Section 152 provides that a shareholder may dissent to an
amendment if his shares are affected adversely, the corporate purpose is substantially altered, the number of directors are reduced, all or substantially
all of the corporate assets are sold or otherwise disposed of, securities or
other assets are distributed in kind, a consolidation or merger is effected, or
a voluntary reorganization is tindertaken. However, Section 153 permits the
extension of the right to dissent to other shareholders by provisions in the
articles. Also, if so provided in the articles, the right to dissent may be denied
if the amendment is approved by a vote of ninety per cent of all outstanding shares and by three-fourths of the shares of the class of shares dissenting.
Section 165 provides for reorganization compromises. Unless otherwise
provided in the articles, three-fourths of the shareholders, or creditors of a
corporation, may submit to a chancery court for approval such a compromise agreement. Thereupon, the one-fourth minority waives the right to
dissent unless such right is reserved in the articles. Section 166 sets out the
procedure when a reorganization has taken place under federal laws.

Sections 169 to 191, inclusive, deal with the dissolution of domestic
corporations. No other corporation statutes provide formulas offering more
flexibility in dissolution ald winding-up of a corporation. A dissolution
may be either voluntary or involuntary. If voluntary, the proceedings may
be conducted out of court or subject to the supervision of the circuit court,
sitting in chancery. Before the allotment of shares or beginning business,
the incorporators may, upon approval by a majority of the subscribers, if

any, dissolve the corporation by filing with the Secretary of State articles of
102. Sec. 157.
103. Sec. 148.
104. Sec. 148, b, c, and d.
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dissolution.

If the corporation is adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, articles of

dissolution may be filed by the board of directors without a vote of the
shareholders.
The ordinary voluntary dissolution in proceedings out of court may be
accomplished by a unanimous vote of the shareholders, or by a resolution
of the board of directors upon approval of an affirmative vote of two-thirds
of the shares entitled to vote thereon. If any class of shares are entitled to
votes as a class, there must also be an affirmative vote of at least a majority
of the shares of such class.
Application is made to the court if the dissolution is to be carried on
under its supervision. Moreover, at any stage, the proceedings may be
shifted from a proceeding out of court to a proceeding under supervision
of the court. Even after a dissolution is completed out of court, if any
question arises as to possible liabilities, etc., the board of directors or trustees may, instead of filing articles of dissolution with the Secretary of State,
petition the court for an order declaring the corporation dissolved and
wound up after a ruling on any matters in dispute. Every phase of the various steps in the alternate methods of the procedures in dissolving, windingup, and distribution of assets is comprehensively formulated.
Provisions and procedures in the domestication and withdrawal of foreign corporations are fully set out,' as are also the procedures in preparing,
executing and filing of the various forms of articles, decrees and other documents. ", All articles and other documents to be filed with the Secretary of
State are prepared in triplicate, executed, and forwarded to the Secretary of
State. The Secretary of State stamps them "filed," and issues an appropriate certificate, when such is required, in triplicate. The first copy of the
articles or other document, along with the third copy of such certificate, is
filed in the office of the Secretary of State. The second copy of each is
mailed, by registered mail with return receipt requested, to the clerk of the
circuit court of the county where the registered office of the corporation is
located. Such clerk is to file these copies in his office. The return receipt
is filed by the Secretary of State when received. The third copy of the
105. Sees. 192-98.
106. Sees. 199-231.
The present statutes of a total of nine states (Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Texas)
apparently require no public filing of corporate records in the county where the registered
office or principal place of business is located. The proposed Florida Act provides for
such filing, while the proposed Texas Act fails to require such modern procedure. Fron1
the standpoint of the public and the bar, such local filing is strongly favored. On the
other hand, it means many more fees for the office of the Secretary of State if such filing
is not required. Therefore, when the Secretary of State is able to exert control over the
matter, it is quite possible that the attorneys and the public will be denied the benefits
resulting from the filing in the county. Mr. John Ben Shepperd, Secretary of State of
Texas, is serving as chairman of the Interim Committee of the Texas Legislature, so
apparently the lawyers of Texas will be required to either depend upon correspondence
or scud across the expansive "wide-open spaces" of that state to Austin for corporate
information which should be right at hand in the county.
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articles, or other document, and his original certificate, is delivered or mailed
to the corporation. Such records of the Secretary of State and the clerk of
the circuit court are subject to public inspection, and copies thereof, when
duly certified by the Secretary of State or clerk of the circuit court, are
receivable in evidence in any court of the state.
In the case of mergers and consolidations, enough extra copies of the
articles, etc., must be supplied the Secretary of State so that a copy thereof,
along with a copy of the appropriate certificate, will be available for forwarding to the clerk of the circuit court of each county where the registered
office of each constituent corporation is located and to each constituent
corporation insofar as the registered offices of such constituent corporations
are located in this State.
For observing the procedure in filing corporate documents by the Secretary of State, let us use the articles of incorporation of a proposed corporation as an example. Upon receiving the articles in triplicate along with
the necessary fees, he examines the articles and if they conform to law he
proceeds to stamp them, etc., as hertofore set out.' 0' If they do not conform to law, he returns them to the incorporators with a notation as to the
deficiency. In the event lie is uncertain as to a point of law raised by some
questionable matter in the articles, he states the point of law involved and
submits it, along with a written request to the Attorney General for a written opinion thereon. The Attorney General in turn checks the law on the
issue involved and submits to the Secretary of State a written opinion setting
out the interpretation of the law and its application to the problem at
hand. '" This opinion is binding upon the Secretary of State until it is
overruled by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Secretary of State then
makes a ruling in conformity with the opinion of the Attorney General.
If the incorporators-or the board of directors, receiver, or other person, or
groups presenting any articles or other documents to the Secretary of State
for filing-wish to contest any ruling by the Secretary of State, they may
effect an appeal directly to the circuit court.'
The duties of the Secretary
of State and other state officials relating to corporations are fully set out in
the Act.
Owing to the many ramifications of a modern corporation code as
articulate and comprehensive as the Florida Act purports to be, space only
permits a treatment of its more important features. The relative coniprehensiveness of this Act is brought into focus when it is mentioned that it,
while stripped of all possible redundancy, contains, including its table of
contents, something like seventy thousand words. Thus, it makes up
approximately three times as much word-content as the Texas Act. The
A. B. A. draft is of approximately the same length as the Texas Act. One
107. Sec. 225.
108. Sec. 237.
109. See. 244.
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of the prime complaints against the present Florida corporation statutes is
that they fail to cover half as much of the field of corporation law as is
covered by the corporation statutes of such states as California, Delaware,
Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma. Thc proposed Florida Act is
comparable in length with the corporation statutes of the states above
nientioned.

